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BANKRUPTCY’S LORELEI: THE DANGEROUS 
ALLURE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
BANKRUPTCY* 
ADAM J. LEVITIN** 
The idea of a bankruptcy procedure for large, systemically 
important financial institutions exercises an irresistible draw for 
some policymakers and academics. Financial institution 
bankruptcy promises to be a transparent, law-based process in 
which resolution of failed financial institutions is navigated in the 
courts. Financial institution bankruptcy presents itself as the 
antithesis of an arbitrary and discretionary bailout regime. It 
promises to eliminate the moral hazard of “too big to fail” by 
ensuring that creditors will incur losses rather than being bailed 
out. Financial institution bankruptcy holds out the possibility of 
market discipline instead of an extensive bureaucratic regulatory 
system. 
This Article argues that financial institution bankruptcy is a 
dangerous siren song that lures with false promises. Instead of 
instilling market discipline and avoiding the favoritism of 
bailouts, financial institution bankruptcy would likely simply 
result in bailouts in bankruptcy garb. It would encourage bank 
deregulation without the elimination of the moral hazard that 
produces financial crises. In particular, it would undermine the 
federal regulators’ single most powerful tool for managing 
systemic risk, the living wills power, even while imposing a 
resolution process that is doomed to failure. 
A successful bankruptcy is not possible for a large financial 
institution absent massive financing for operations while in 
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bankruptcy, and that financing can only reliably be obtained on 
short notice and in distressed credit markets from one source: the 
U.S. government. Government financing of a bankruptcy would 
inevitably come with strings attached, including favorable 
treatment for certain creditor groups. This would result in 
bankruptcies that resemble those of Chrysler and General 
Motors, which are much decried by proponents of financial 
institution bankruptcy as having been disguised bailouts. 
The central flaw with the idea of financial institution bankruptcy 
is that it fails to address the political nature of systemic risk. What 
makes a financial crisis systemically important is whether its 
social costs are politically acceptable. When they are not, bailouts 
will occur in some form because crisis containment inevitably 
trumps rule of law. Resolution of systemic risk is a political 
question, and its weight would warp the judicial process. 
Financial institution bankruptcy will merely produce bailouts in 
the guise of bankruptcy while undermining judicial legitimacy 
and the rule of law. 
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Financial institution bankruptcy is the Lorelei of the 
restructuring world.1 The idea of financial institution bankruptcy calls 
out in a golden voice, singing, “I am Law, I am Law. I brook no 
favoritism or cronyism, I permit no bailout. My rules are neutral, 
predictable, and generally applicable. I answer not to the whim of 
unaccountable bureaucrats, but am Law.” With this siren song of false 
promises, the tempting concept of financial institution bankruptcy 
(“FIB”)—the use of federal bankruptcy courts as a forum for 
resolving large, failed financial institutions—lures unwitting 
policymakers to the rocky shoals of a financial crisis, for FIB is not 
workable as a restructuring system. Ultimately, the real work an FIB 
procedure would do would be to undermine the “living wills” process 
that gives federal regulators substantial discretion to impose 
additional regulatory requirements on or even break up the largest 
banks. FIB thus threatens to weaken financial regulation while 
providing an unworkable process for dealing with the consequences, a 
formula that all but guarantees bailouts.  
The lure of the FIB Lorelei comes not from her inherent beauty 
but from her apparent, comparative attractiveness relative to the 
alternative method of dealing with the failure of large financial 
institutions—bailouts. Nobody likes a bailout. Bailouts are messy by 
nature. They do not follow rules or law. Instead, they are ad hoc, 
 
 1. HEINRICH HEINE, Lorelei, in HIS WIT WISDOM POETRY 42, 42–43 (Newell 
Dunbar ed., Boston, J. G. Cupples Co. 1892) (naming the siren who, from her perch atop a 
mountain overlooking the River Rhine, draws the gazes of sailors upwards and away from 
the treacherous rocks in their course). 
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improvised, and unpredictable responses to crises that are readily 
open to abuse. Bailouts are messy mainly because they have a 
singular goal to which all other concerns, including rule of law, are 
temporarily subordinated: containing financial crises so they do not 
wreak broader havoc on the economy. Implicit in bailouts is the idea 
that the rule of law is a means to social welfare, not an end in itself. In 
a bailout, if rule of law impedes social welfare, the law will be 
stretched, changed, ignored, or jettisoned, at least temporarily.2 
Revulsion toward bailouts is not just a function of their 
lawlessness. It is also because bailouts create opportunities for 
government favoritism, as some have alleged regarding the General 
Motors (“GM”) and Chrysler bankruptcies.3 By deciding whom to 
bail out and on what terms, the government is not just picking 
winners and losers in the economy but also potentially enriching 
particular parties at taxpayer expense.4 Given that bailouts are often 
undertaken through independent regulatory agencies that are not 
directly answerable at the ballot box, this cronyism is all the more 
distressing because there is not even an ex post disciplinary 
mechanism. 
Moreover, to the extent creditors of large financial institutions 
believe ex ante they will be bailed out if a large financial institution 
fails, they will be more reckless in their lending to large financial 
institutions and extend too much underpriced credit.5 The expectation 
 
 2. Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (2009) 
(“[C]ontainment may call for measures .	.	. that are legally and politically fraught.”); Adam 
J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A 
Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2017 (2014) (book review).  
 3. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of Law, 
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 200 (2012) (“When politicians are not constrained they 
take advantage of that freedom of opportunity to benefit themselves. The General Motors 
and Chrysler bailouts might be the most obvious and egregious examples of this dynamic 
from the financial crisis.”); Paul Roderick Gregory, American Airlines Shows the 
Corruption of Obama’s GM Bailout, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2012, 2:16 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2012/02/06/american-airlines-shows-the-
corruption-of-obamas-gm-bailout/#48a8730d5eb8 [https://perma.cc/MTD3-UCP7] (arguing 
that the Obama Administration’s bailout of GM was the result of political favoritism 
toward the United Auto Workers labor union). 
 4. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 200 (“With Chrysler, the government intervened to 
take money from the company’s creditors—which included the pension funds for teachers 
and policemen—and give it to the retirement and health care funds of the politically 
powerful United Auto Workers, who had an unsecured claim in the case.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017: Hearing on H.R. 1667 
Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 9 (2017) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1667] 
(statement of John B. Taylor, Professor, Stanford University) (arguing that the 
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of bailouts not only creates a moral hazard for lenders but it also 
incentivizes financial institutions to grow to be too big to fail—that is, 
to grow to a size and importance where their creditors are likely to be 
bailed out if they fail because the social costs and disruption from not 
doing so would be politically unacceptable.6 The result of anticipated 
bailouts is a downward spiral of reckless lending and bailouts. 
FIB is conceived of as a totally private regime, but such a totally 
private resolution system for large financial institutions is an 
ideological pipedream that has become an unhealthy distraction in 
financial regulatory policy debates. This Article argues that the idea 
of FIB functioning without extensive government involvement is a 
pernicious market fantasy, a siren song that is not workable. FIB 
poses a number of insurmountable practical obstacles and 
irreconcilable policy goals, most notably the inability of a large failed 
financial institution to obtain the “debtor-in-possession” (“DIP”) 
financing required to preserve the value of its assets during 
bankruptcy. Attempting to resolve a large systemically important 
financial institution’s failure through an FIB process without DIP 
lending would result in a value-destroying disaster that would 
exacerbate the spillover effects from the institution’s failure. Thus, 
while FIB holds out the promise of being an alternative to bailouts, 
any viable FIB process would inevitably be little more than a bailout 
masquerading as a bankruptcy. Nonetheless, all FIB legislation to 
date has been for wholly private FIB processes.  
The first of these obstacles is that failed financial institutions 
would require enormous liquidity support while in bankruptcy—tens 
if not hundreds of billions of dollars. To be sure, it is possible to 
construct a bankruptcy based on a high-speed sale process. But a 
curtailment of the failed firm’s time in bankruptcy prior to an 
expedited sale is no solution to the liquidity problem. Instead, it 
merely shifts the liquidity problem to the asset purchaser, which lacks 
the protection of the automatic stay because it is not a debtor subject 
to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. If the purchaser is insufficiently 
 
expectation of bailouts reduces creditor incentive to monitor loans). The concern about 
creditors expecting bailouts sits in tension with another frequent criticism of bailouts—
namely, their unpredictability. See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the 
Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 311, 320 (Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014) (noting the 
problem of unpredictability for bailouts). 
 6. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439–40 (2011) 
[hereinafter Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts]. 
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liquid, it will be subject to a creditor run, in which case the FIB 
process will have accomplished nothing in terms of financial stability.  
The enormous level of liquidity support required to ensure a 
smooth FIB process would have to be obtained on extremely short 
notice in distressed financial markets. Realistically, it could come 
from one source and one source only: the U.S. government. As DIP 
lender (or as the lender to the asset purchaser in the event of a high-
speed sale), the U.S. government would get to call the shots in the 
bankruptcy—that is what DIP lenders do. For example, DIP lenders 
routinely dictate detailed timelines for asset sales with bidding 
procedures to their liking and impose corporate officers of their 
choosing on debtors.7 The U.S. government as DIP lender would be 
able to dictate which assets would be transferred to and which 
liabilities would be assumed by the solvent purchaser and therefore 
effectively paid in full. In other words, the executive branch of the 
U.S. government would be determining the effective distributional 
consequences of the bankruptcy, which would not necessarily be in 
accord with formal statutory distributional requirements.  
This scenario is exactly what occurred in the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies. In both cases, the U.S. government, as DIP lender, 
required fast asset sales that complied with the terms on which it 
insisted,8 and the assets were sold to entities partially owned by the 
U.S. government. Moreover, in both cases, the asset sales were 
conditioned upon the buyer assuming certain favored liabilities of the 
debtor, particularly obligations owed to the firms’ unionized 
employees and retirees who would have received nothing in a 
liquidation. Ironically, proponents of FIB have been among the 
leading critics of those bankruptcies, but Chrysler and GM are the 
template for what can be expected with an FIB process. FIB will 
result in precisely what its proponents despise—a bailout that rewards 
some favored creditors (here, the unionized employees)—albeit in the 
form of bankruptcy. 
Because of financial institutions’ massive liquidity needs, the 
only way FIB could realistically function is with government 
involvement. Such government involvement would warp the 
bankruptcy process to produce results that are indistinguishable from 
 
 7. ADAM J. LEVITIN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND 
MODERN COMMERCIAL MARKETS 376, 408–09 (2d ed. 2018). 
 8. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 271, 288–89 (2012). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 243 (2019) 
2019] FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY 249 
 
bailouts. And it would do so with the added harm of being done 
under color of law, thereby undermining the very rule of law virtue 
that makes bankruptcy attractive in the first place.  
None of this may matter to some FIB proponents, however. For 
some FIB supporters, the ultimate goal may be bank deregulation. 
Generally, the existence of an FIB process would facilitate the 
argument that private market discipline can substitute for public 
regulation. The operational problems with FIB would not become 
manifest until a large financial institution fails. In the interim, 
however, the availability of an FIB process would serve as a cudgel to 
push for bank deregulation based on claims of adequate market 
discipline through bankruptcy. 
More specifically, however, FIB legislation undermines the single 
most powerful tool regulators have for policing systemic risk: the 
“living wills” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.9 The living wills power requires the largest 
financial institutions to present plans for their resolution in 
bankruptcy to federal regulators. If regulators do not deem a 
resolution plan credible, then regulators have substantial discretion to 
impose additional regulatory requirements on the financial institution 
or even to break it up.10 But enacting a special FIB procedure would 
mean that Congress believes it possible for these large institutions to 
resolve themselves in bankruptcy, making it all but impossible for 
regulators not to deem credible these institutions’ living wills.  
Thus, FIB proposals would simultaneously tie regulators’ hands 
in terms of preventing crises ex ante while imposing an unworkable 
process for managing crises ex post. This means FIB is ironically a 
recipe for a bailout, for that will be the only response possible in the 
wake of a failed FIB.  
FIB proponents also fail to grapple with the inappropriateness of 
the courts as a venue for dealing with systemic risk.11 The failure of a 
systemically important financial institution is materially different 
from that of most nonfinancial businesses. The failure of a 
nonfinancial business is a private matter between the business and its 
creditors. The spillover effects from such nonfinancial bankruptcies 
are likely to be more limited in most situations. While there can be 
 
 9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §	165(a), (d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1423–24, 1426 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §	5365(a), (d) 
(2012)). 
 10. 12 U.S.C. §	5365(d)(5) (2012). 
 11. See Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, supra note 6, at 446–50. 
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domino effects up and down supply chains and across an industry due 
to single-sourced suppliers,12 the failure of nonfinancial firms does not 
pose a threat to the credit market and payment system that are the 
lifeblood and arteries of the economy.  
Systemically important financial institutions are another matter. 
Their failure threatens disruption to the entire global financial 
system. It is, then, not simply a private matter but a matter of public 
policy concern, both because of its broad-ranging economic effects 
and its likelihood of triggering federal government involvement in the 
form of financial support. Put another way, the public is affected by 
the distribution in the bankruptcy of a systemically important 
financial institution, even though it is not a “creditor.” Resolution of 
systemically important financial institutions is thus a political question 
because it implicates the public fisc and general distributional 
questions, not simply firm-specific ones.13 
The courts, however, are a poor venue for resolving political 
problems—as the political question doctrine recognizes—because 
political pressures can corrupt the judicial process and generally 
undermine its legitimacy.14 FIB would turn bankruptcy into a political 
process for which it is wholly unsuited.15 
Bankruptcy is a process suited for addressing the microconcerns 
of individual firms, not macropolicy concerns. It is not a transparent, 
participatory forum capable of giving effective voice to noncreditor 
constituencies who may nevertheless be significantly affected by the 
bankruptcy.16 Furthermore, bankruptcy is not a democratic forum. 
Many key issues are decided solely by a non–Article III judge and 
are, as with many issues, effectively unreviewable on appeal.17 To the 
 
 12. See id. at 453–61 (explaining how nonfinancial firms can pose systemic risk). 
 13. Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 
443 (2016). 
 14. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 69 (2d ed. 1986). 
 15. Given the dysfunction of the formal legislative process in Congress, one might 
reasonably argue that the courts are a preferable forum for addressing political issues, 
insofar as they are a forum that will in fact address issues, even if the process is less than 
democratic. 
 16. See, e.g., In re Alpha Nat. Res. Inc., 544 B.R. 848, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016) 
(denying standing to environmental groups to object to court approval of a settlement 
agreement between the debtor coal company and the State of West Virginia). 
 17. Some issues are effectively unreviewable because of statutory limitations on 
appellate remedies. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §	363(m) (2012) (prohibiting review of 
consummated sale orders on appeal); id. §	364(e) (prohibiting review of consummated 
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extent there is a vote, it is a vote only of classes of impaired creditors 
and shareholders, not affected third parties.18 If the government were 
involved in the process, it would participate by contract through a 
court order approving a nonappealable DIP financing agreement.19 
The terms of such an agreement are not subject to the normal 
procedural safeguards of Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking 
or to any constraints beyond some minimal requirements in the 
Bankruptcy Code.20 Bankruptcy is thus a particularly nontransparent, 
nonparticipatory form of policymaking.21 
This does not mean that the politics disappear from bankruptcy, 
only that they function differently outside the legislative process. The 
distributional concerns that are so intense when dealing with systemic 
financial crises mean that political pressures will inevitably corrupt 
the FIB process and turn FIB into nothing more than a bailout in 
judicial garb. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the 
background against which FIB proposals have emerged: the 
inadequacy of Chapter 11 for resolving systemically important 
financial institutions; discontent with the bailouts following the 2008 
financial crisis; and unease with the post-2008 legislative response, the 
“Orderly Liquidation Authority” regime created by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Part I also 
explains how FIB proposals would function to undermine the living 
wills process that provides the most potent tool in the arsenal of the 
existing financial regulatory regime. Part II explains the basic form 
that FIB would likely take before addressing the fundamental tension 
 
financing orders on appeal). But see id. §	1144 (allowing revocation of confirmation orders 
if procured by fraud). Other issues become functionally moot because they are not 
appealable—absent leave of the bankruptcy court—until the issuance of a final order. Id. 
§	158(a). Additionally, most circuits recognize some form of the doctrine of equitable 
mootness, which limits appellate review. See, e.g., Ullrich v. Welt (In re Nica Holdings, 
Inc.), 810 F.3d 781, 788–90 (11th Cir. 2015); R2 Investments, LDC v. Charter Commc’ns, 
Inc. (In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.), 691 F.3d 476, 481–82 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Cont’l 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996). Further, critical questions such as valuation are 
appealed on a clear error basis, which means that the bankruptcy court receives deference 
for its valuation determination. See LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 325.  
 18. 11 U.S.C. §	1126(a), (f) (2012) (providing the holders of claims and equity 
interests the right to vote on a bankruptcy plan but conclusively deeming unimpaired 
classes of claims and interests to have voted to support the plan). 
 19. See id. §	364(a)–(e). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009). 
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between trying to reduce both moral hazard and systemic disruption 
through bankruptcy. Part III then turns to a discussion of the practical 
obstacles to using bankruptcy to restructure financial institutions: lack 
of DIP financing, international coordination difficulties, problems 
concerning derivatives and other financial contracts, and the lack of a 
mechanism for addressing the valuation uncertainty that would chill 
the market for buyers of the failed institution’s assets. The only way 
to overcome these obstacles is through federal government 
intervention in a bankruptcy, turning bankruptcy into a bailout. Part 
IV demonstrates how the resolution of systemically important 
financial institutions is a political question and therefore best avoided 
by the courts. Accordingly, the Article concludes by suggesting that 
rather than follow FIB’s siren song onto jagged rocks, we would do 
better to devote our energies to crafting a procedural mechanism for 
bailouts that imposes transparency, basic procedural checks, and ex 
post accountability on government and bailout recipients. 
I.  THE SIREN SONG OF BANKRUPTCY 
The government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis was varied 
but can largely be characterized as an ad hoc series of bailouts of a 
wide range of financial institutions and markets. Some of these 
bailouts were marred by a sense of cronyism or deliberate action to 
protect favored financial institutions. Aversion to the capricious and 
cronyistic nature of the bailouts has prompted calls to revise the 
Bankruptcy Code to provide an effective mechanism for the 
resolution of large financial institutions in bankruptcy. 
A. The Inadequacy of Chapter 11 for Resolving Financial Institutions  
Bankruptcy has always been available as a forum for resolving 
certain failed financial institutions, but only in the sense of a well-
ordered liquidation. Restructuring such institutions, however, 
whether through a plan of reorganization or through a going-concern 
asset sale, is not currently practically possible in bankruptcy. 
As a preliminary matter, some financial institutions are not 
eligible for bankruptcy in the first place. Banks and insurance 
companies cannot file for bankruptcy22 and are instead resolved under 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) bank 
receivership or applicable state insurance insolvency regime. These 
 
 22. 11 U.S.C. §	109(b)(2), (d) (2012). 
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resolutions are facilitated by the availability of funding from the 
FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund and state insurance insolvency funds. 
In addition, banks and insurance companies are rarely stand-
alone corporations. They are usually part of larger corporate 
conglomerates. In such conglomerates, while the bank or insurance 
company subsidiary is not eligible for bankruptcy, the holding 
company and other affiliates are able to file. Holding companies, 
however, typically liquidate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Liquidation is 
often the only option since there is generally no business left to 
restructure after the subsidiary bank or insurance company has been 
taken into receivership in which it is either wound down or sold. 
Likewise, securities and commodities broker-dealers are eligible for 
bankruptcy, but only for Chapter 7 liquidation,23 although this can be 
transformed into a liquidation run by the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (“SIPC”).24 Reorganization in bankruptcy is 
not allowed for securities and commodities brokerages.  
Thus, if a financial conglomerate were to fail, its various pieces 
would be resolved under several different regimes: Chapter 11 for the 
holding company, Chapter 7 and possibly SIPC liquidation for the 
broker-dealer subsidiary, FDIC receivership for the bank subsidiary, 
and a state insurance receivership for the insurance company 
receivership. (This assumes an entirely domestic firm; foreign 
subsidiaries would further complicate the picture.)25 The result of this 
piecemeal resolution regime is the loss of any synergies that exist 
within the conglomerate. In addition, depending on the details of the 
firms’ structuring, there could be serious operational disruptions.26 
In theory, then, one might attempt to resolve the firm in a single 
Chapter 11 proceeding at the holding company level. If the holding 
company were to guarantee the obligations of its subsidiaries, then 
structural priority would subordinate the holding companies’ 
creditors to those of its subsidiaries. With all losses concentrated on 
holding company creditors, there would be no need to put any 
subsidiaries into a receivership. The holding company could then 
attempt to use the Chapter 11 process to arrange a going-concern sale 
of its various subsidiaries, which, if successful, would preserve any 
 
 23. See id. §	109(d). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. §	78eee(a)(3)(A), (b)(1) (2012); id. §	78fff(b).  
 25. See infra Section III.B. 
 26. For example, disruptions might result if there were centralized cash or IT 
management, intercompany licensing arrangements, or intercompany leasing 
arrangements. 
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synergies within the affiliate constellation and also prevent any 
operations disruptions. 
It is unlikely, however, that such a resolution could work under 
the existing Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. Chapter 11 is inadequate 
for resolution of a financial conglomerate through a going-concern 
sale of all of the operating subsidiaries because of the exception to the 
automatic stay for certain financial contracts. The filing of a 
bankruptcy petition triggers the “automatic stay,” a federal injunction 
against most collection activities outside of the bankruptcy claims 
process.27 The stay only applies to the actual debtor, not to its 
nondebtor affiliates, so it would not protect the subsidiaries in the 
event of the parent holding company’s bankruptcy.  
There are also numerous exceptions to the automatic stay, most 
notably a set of exceptions that allow the debtor’s counterparties on 
various types of financial contracts—swaps, repos, forward contracts, 
securities contracts, commodities contracts, and master netting 
agreements—to accelerate, terminate, and liquidate these agreements 
and any collateral posted by the debtor to guarantee their 
performance.28 Even in the best circumstances, a sale would not be 
instantaneous upon the bankruptcy filing. As a result, the debtor’s 
counterparties could always accelerate and terminate their contracts 
and then liquidate any collateral the debtor posted, if they are in the 
money. Thus, the counterparties could deprive the debtor of critical 
assets that would be necessary to continue to operate as a going 
concern and thereby frustrate any sale. Instead, there would be a 
disorderly, piecemeal liquidation of the debtor that might impair its 
operations and result in its subsidiaries being taken into receivership 
themselves. 
To the extent that a financial firm is not systemically important, 
the disruptions caused by its failure and piecemeal resolution are no 
more concerning than any other market inefficiency. In this regard, 
Chapter 11’s shortcomings as a process for one-stop shopping for 
quotidian financial institution resolution are unfortunate, but not a 
critical policy concern. But for systemically important firms, 
avoidance of disruptions and spillover effects from the resolution 
process is of paramount importance as a financial regulatory policy 
matter. 
 
 27. 11 U.S.C. §	362(a) (2012). 
 28. Id. §	362(b)(6)–(7), (17), (27); id. §§	555, 559–561. 
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B. Calls for a Financial Institution Bankruptcy Process 
In light of the shortcomings of existing bankruptcy law as a 
method for resolving systemically important failed financial 
institutions, there has been considerable interest in revising the 
Bankruptcy Code to facilitate financial institution resolution, 
although to date bankruptcy law remains unchanged in this regard. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
the major legislative response to the 2008 crisis, called for a study of 
bankruptcy alternatives for resolving large financial institution 
failures.29 The House of Representatives has since thrice passed a 
version of a “Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act.”30 An FIB 
procedure has also appeared in both versions of the CHOICE Act,31 
the Republican Dodd-Frank Act alternative, the second iteration of 
which passed the House.32 Another FIB bill has been repeatedly 
introduced in various versions in the Senate.33 Likewise, various 
academics and the Hoover Institution have called for the creation of a 
“Chapter 14” in the Bankruptcy Code for an FIB procedure.34 These 
proposals would cover all bank and financial holding companies, not 
just systemically important ones (however measured). But the policy 
 
 29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §	216, 124 Stat. 1376, 1519 (2010). 
 30. Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(passed House); Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2016, H.R. 2947, 114th Cong. 
(2016) (passed House); Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. 5421, 113th 
Cong. (2014) (passed House).  
 31.  Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§	121–123 (2017) (passed 
House); Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. §§	231–232 (2016). 
 32. H.R. 10. 
 33.  Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S. 1841, 114th Cong. 
(2015); Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S. 1861, 113th Cong. (2013). 
A third version of the legislation was discussed at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in 
November 2018, but had not yet been formally introduced by the time this Article went to 
press. Big Bank Bankruptcy: 10 Years After Lehman Brothers: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
 34. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14: A Proposal, in 
BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT 25, 26 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012); 
Skeel, supra note 5, at 329–33; Thomas H. Jackson, Resolving Financial Institution: A 
Proposed Bankruptcy Code Alternative, BANKING PERSP. (2014), 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2014/2014-q1-banking-perspectives/
articles/resolving-financial-institutions [https://perma.cc/4CCR-37SR] [hereinafter Jackson, 
Resolving Financial Institutions]; see generally HOOVER INST., MAKING FAILURE 
FEASIBLE: HOW BANKRUPTCY REFORM CAN END “TOO BIG TO FAIL” (Kenneth E. 
Scott, Thomas H. Jackson & John B. Taylor eds., 2015) (proposing a version of Chapter 14 
that responds to criticisms of FIB).  
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impetus for these proposals is driven by concerns about large, 
systemically important institutions. 
Bankruptcy, according to the logic behind FIB proposals, ensures 
the rule of law.35 It is a transparent, judicially supervised process, with 
public court filings and hearings in open court. In bankruptcy, all 
transactions outside of the ordinary course of business require judicial 
approval,36 and bankruptcy law gives all parties in interest a general 
right to be heard and to challenge proposed transactions in court.37 
Furthermore, any sort of FIB regime would draw on well-established 
rules from corporate bankruptcy.38  
Bankruptcy, FIB backers argue, would prevent discretionary, 
cronyistic intervention by government and would allow for the 
restructuring of failed financial institutions without disruptions to the 
wider economy.39 Any resolution of a failed financial institution 
would be determined efficiently by private ordering in the context of 
bankruptcy, not by government fiat.40 At the same time, FIB 
proponents believe that bankruptcy would ensure that a failed 
financial institution’s creditors would internalize their losses, and the 
 
 35. See, e.g., Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 2947 
Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (opening remarks of Tom Marino, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law) (“The bankruptcy 
process has long been favored as the primary mechanism for dealing with distressed and 
failing companies.	This is due to its impartial nature, adherence to established precedent, 
judiciary oversight, and grounding in the principles of due process and the rule of law.”); 
Jackson, Resolving Financial Institutions, supra note 34. 
 36. 11 U.S.C. §§	363(c), 364(b)–(d), 365(a) (2012). 
 37. Id. §	1109(b). 
 38. See, e.g., Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§	121–123 (2017) 
(passed House) (incorporating Chapter 11 bankruptcy provisions for an FIB procedure); 
Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. §§	231–232 (2016). 
 39. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1667, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of John B. Taylor, 
Professor, Stanford University) (“The goal of these provisions is to let a failing financial 
firm go into bankruptcy in a predictable, rules-based manner without causing disruptive 
spillovers in the economy while permitting people to continue to use its financial services 
without running.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Jackson, Resolving Financial Institutions, supra note 34 (“In bankruptcy, 
it is market-discipline first and foremost; in Title II, there inevitably is a heavier layer of 
regulatory overlay and control.”); John B. Taylor, It’s Time to Pass the Financial 
Institutions Bankruptcy Act, ECON. ONE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://economicsone.com/
2017/03/23/its-time-to-pass-the-financial-institutions-bankruptcy-act/ [http://perma.cc/N6PM-
PGD9] (noting that, in contrast to government decisionmaking in an OLA resolution, 
“under bankruptcy reorganization, private parties, motivated and incentivized by profit 
and loss considerations, make key decisions about the direction of the new firm”). 
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credible threat of this loss internalization would incentivize creditors 
to demand that financial institutions assume less risk.41  
C. The Orderly Liquidation Authority as a Response to the 2008 
Bailouts 
Despite these supposed virtues of bankruptcy, Congress has so 
far declined to pursue it as the venue for resolving systemically 
important failed financing institutions. Congress instead opted to 
leave in place the hodge-podge combination of Chapter 7, Chapter 
11, SIPC liquidation, FDIC bank receivership, and state insurance 
receiverships as the venues for resolving the various pieces of non–
systemically important financial institutions. For systemically 
important institutions, Congress instead adapted the FDIC bank 
receivership process into a broader financial conglomerate resolution 
procedure known as the Title II Orderly Liquidation Authority 
(“OLA”).42 
OLA gives federal regulators broad powers to place failing 
“financial companies”—not just insured depositories—that pose 
systemic risk into a receivership administered by the FDIC. OLA, 
which has not been used to date, has numerous statutory limitations,43 
but it would also give federal regulators substantial discretion in 
whether to trigger the authority. Triggering OLA would require the 
turning of “three keys” by various regulators: (1) the Treasury 
Secretary, in consultation with the President, must determine that the 
firm is in default or in danger of default, that its resolution outside of 
OLA would have “serious adverse effects on financial stability in the 
United States,” and the effect on creditors is “appropriate” given the 
threat to financial stability;44 (2) two-thirds of the Federal Reserve 
Board must approve the receivership;45 and (3) two-thirds of the 
FDIC Board (or two-thirds of the SEC for broker-dealers or the 
Director of the Federal Insurance Office for insurance companies) 
must approve the receivership.46 The requirement of the three keys 
ensures that OLA would not be triggered without broad buy-in from 
 
 41. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1667, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of John B. Taylor, 
Professor, Stanford University) (“Chapter 11 ensures that creditors bear losses and this 
reduces moral hazard and excessive risk-taking.”). 
 42. See 12 U.S.C. §§	5381–5394 (2012).  
 43. See, e.g., id. §	5386 (imposing mandatory terms on all orderly liquidation actions, 
including a priority of distributions). 
 44. Id. §	5383(b)(1)–(2), (4). 
 45. Id. §	5383(a)(1).  
 46. Id. 
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both a politically accountable party and politically-insulated 
independent agencies. In other words, OLA is designed to be a 
consensus-based procedure.  
Once OLA is triggered, the FDIC would have substantial 
discretion in implementing a receivership.47 For example, while the 
FDIC is directed to “ensure that unsecured creditors bear losses in 
accordance with” a statutory order of priority that is substantially 
similar to that of Chapter 7 bankruptcy,48 the FDIC is also authorized 
to sell some or all the assets of the failed financial institution.49 Such a 
sale may be to a third-party buyer or to a “bridge” financial 
institution formed by the FDIC, the stock of which could then be sold 
to a third-party purchaser, thereby enabling a stock sale rather than 
an asset sale.50 
An asset sale may be accompanied by an assumption of select 
liabilities as a form of consideration from the buyer.51 Greater 
assumption of liabilities would reduce the purchase price paid in 
other forms of consideration. To illustrate, a purchaser might pay $50 
billion in cash and stock for the assets of a failed financial institution, 
or it could pay only $40 billion in cash and stock and assume liabilities 
of $10 billion. A creditor whose obligation is assumed by a buyer or 
by the bridge financial institution will get paid in full by the buyer or 
bridge institution (unless it too fails) and no longer has a claim in the 
receivership. That creditor, therefore, would not be subject to the 
distributional priority limitation on the FDIC in the receivership.52 
 
 47. Id. §§	5384, 5386, 5390. 
 48. Id. §	5386(3). The order of priority for creditor claims is set out in §	5390(b). Cf. 11 
U.S.C. §	726 (2012) (detailing priority of claims in Chapter 7). 
 49. 12 U.S.C. §	5390(a)(1)(A) (2012) (giving the FDIC, as receiver, all powers of the 
failed financial institution); id. §	5390(a)(1)(G) (authorizing the transfer of any asset or 
liability or merger of the failed financial institution); id. §	5390(a)(9)(E) (providing 
directions for the disposition of assets of failed financial institutions); id. §	5390(h)(5) 
(authorizing a bridge company to acquire assets or assume liabilities of the failed financial 
institution). 
 50. Id. §	5390(a)(1)(F) (authorizing the FDIC to create a “bridge company”); id. 
§	5390(h)(3)(A) (permitting a bridge financial company to assume or acquire assets and 
liabilities of the failed financial institution); id. §	5390(h)(5)(A) (authorizing the FDIC, as 
receiver, to merge the failed financial institution with another company or “transfer any 
assets and liabilities” of the failed financial institutions). A stock sale is a simpler and 
cheaper transaction because the only asset that needs to be transferred is ownership of the 
stock. In contrast, an asset sale might require separate formal deed recordings and transfer 
taxes to be paid on individual assets, particularly in the case of real estate transfers.  
 51. Id. §	5390(h)(3)(A). 
 52. Id. §	5390(a)(1)(G) (authorizing a merger or transfer of any asset or liability of the 
failed financial institution); id. §	5390(b) (setting forth priority of claims). 
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The only generally applicable material limitation on the FDIC’s 
ability to transfer liabilities of the failed financial institution to a 
bridge company is that “similarly situated creditors”—an undefined 
phrase with several statutory exceptions—must be treated the same in 
most situations.53 However one interprets the phrase “similarly 
situated creditors,” no such limitation applies to assumption of 
liabilities in sales to third-party buyers. 
The federal government is also authorized to provide financing 
to continue operating the failed financial institution in OLA.54 This 
financing, which would ultimately be recouped from other large 
financial institutions, facilitates the entire resolution process and 
ensures that value is not lost because of illiquidity. Notably, OLA 
does not provide statutory restrictions on the terms of financing 
beyond a provision detailing the priority of the government’s funding 
claim on the failed firm’s assets.55 This means that the government 
could set the terms of its financing simply as a matter of contract, not 
statute.  
Indeed, given that the enormous situational leverage the 
government will have over a failed firm in an OLA proceeding, the 
government would get whatever terms it wants—the government’s 
offer is one that the failed firm cannot refuse. As such, the terms of 
government financing in an OLA proceeding would likely be at least 
as onerous as DIP financing agreements in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Government-provided financing in OLA, therefore, would come with 
various contractually negotiated provisions that both determine the 
shape of any restructuring and which could effectively benefit certain 
creditor constituencies at the expense of others.56 Not surprisingly, the 
discretion vested in federal regulators has led to criticisms that OLA 
is nothing more than a codified bailout regime.57 
 
 53. Id. §	5390(b)(4) (requiring claims of similarly situated creditors to be treated 
similarly); id. §	5390(h)(5)(E) (requiring similarly situated creditors to be treated in a 
similar manner when assets or liabilities are transferred to a bridge company). Other 
limitations apply to particular types of asset transfers. See, e.g., id. §	5390(c)(9) (requiring 
qualified financial contracts with a counterparty, if transferred at all, to be transferred as a 
complete book of business). 
 54. Id. §	5384(d) (authorizing funding for OLA); id. §	5390(b)(2) (providing priority 
for DIP financing); id. §	5390(n) (creating an “Orderly Liquidation Fund”); id. §	5390(o) 
(providing for assessments on financial institutions to fund an Orderly Liquidation Fund). 
 55. Id. §	5384(d).  
 56. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 409–12. 
 57. See, e.g., Examining How the Dodd-Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-
Funded Bailouts: Hearing on H.R. 34 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 2 
(2013) (opening remarks of Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) 
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D. FIB’s Relationship to OLA and Living Wills 
The relationship between FIB proposals and OLA varies 
depending on the version of legislation proposed. In some bills, FIB 
proponents have paired financial institution bankruptcy legislation 
with a repeal of OLA and various prudential regulatory safeguards.58 
Other FIB bills would leave OLA intact. But even FIB bills that 
preserve OLA still effectuate a significant regulatory rollback, 
however, because the creation of an FIB procedure would allow 
banks to satisfy the Dodd-Frank Act’s living wills requirement59 and 
thereby allows financial institutions to avoid the imposition of 
additional, discretionary derisking regulation.  
Indeed, the political attraction of FIB may be less in its inherent 
benefits as a resolution mechanism than in its collateral effect of 
undermining the case for ex ante prudential bank regulation. 
Advocates of FIB never explicitly tie FIB to bank deregulation, but 
the connection may be seen in the inclusion of an FIB proposal as 
part of the first title in the major House Republican-sponsored bank 
deregulation bill, which would have repealed OLA along with various 
prudential regulatory tools.60 FIB may in fact be a deregulatory 
Trojan Horse. 
Indeed, there has always been an important subtext to all FIB 
proposals, namely the claim that a proper bankruptcy system vitiates 
the need for prudential regulation of financial institutions. The 
thinking is that the threat of ex post losses for creditors in bankruptcy 
creates adequate ex ante incentives for them to lend prudently and 
thereby reduces risk within the financial system in general. In other 
words, FIB is ultimately premised on the conviction that market 
 
(“Regrettably, Dodd-Frank not only fails to end too-big-to-fail and its attendant taxpayer 
bailouts; it actually codifies them into law. .	.	. Title II, Section 210, notwithstanding its ex 
post funding language, clearly creates a taxpayer-funded bailout system that the CBO 
estimates will cost taxpayers over $20 billion.”); see also Evan Weinberger, Trump Orders 
Review of 2 Key Dodd-Frank Powers, LAW360 (Apr. 21, 2017, 1:31 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/915818/trump-orders-review-of-2-key-dodd-frank-powers 
[https://perma.cc/7DJS-2BP6 (dark archive)]. 
 58. See, e.g., Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §	111 (2017) 
(passed House) (repealing OLA); id. §§	131–152 (repealing various prudential regulatory 
tools provided by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2011). 
 59. 12 U.S.C. §	5365(d) (2012). 
 60. See H.R. 10; id. §§	131–152 (repealing various prudential regulatory tools provided 
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2011).   
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discipline can substitute for government regulation as a mode of 
reducing systemic risk.61  
More recent FIB legislation has not included a repeal of OLA, 
and OLA includes a provision allowing the FDIC as OLA receiver to 
dismiss other insolvency proceedings.62 This raises the question of 
what FIB accomplishes if it co-exists with OLA. It is hard to imagine 
regulators preferring the FIB process in which they have less control 
than OLA, not least because they will take the political blame for any 
problems that occur in either mode of resolution. If regulators have 
the choice, they would likely either trigger OLA at the outset or take 
over an FIB and convert it to OLA. The pointlessness of having OLA 
and FIB co-exist suggests that eschewing the repeal of OLA is a 
tactical move by FIB advocates. Enacting FIB will get the camel’s 
nose under the tent, and those advocates can separately repeal OLA 
after passage because FIB would render it superfluous. 
At the very least, however, the presence of an FIB procedure 
would undermine the Dodd-Frank Act requirement that the certain 
very large financial institutions prepare living wills that must be 
approved by regulators. These living wills require financial 
institutions to demonstrate that the financial institution could be 
resolved in a case under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code).63 Failure to 
do so can result in more stringent capital, leverage, and liquidity 
requirements, restrictions on growth, activities, and operations, or 
even divestiture orders.64 
The point of living wills is not to be actual resolution plans. As 
discussed above, it is not credible to resolve a large financial 
institution under Title 11, including in Chapter 11 thereunder.65 
(Indeed, if it were possible, then there would be no need for FIB 
proposals.)66 Instead, living wills are a tool that allows federal 
regulators discretion to force the very largest financial institutions to 
simplify their structures and operations or to impose greater 
 
 61. Ironically, this market discipline is imposed through government regulation in the 
form of bankruptcy law. 
 62. 12 U.S.C. §	5388 (2012). 
 63. Id. §	5365(a), (d).  
 64. Id. §	5365(d)(5). 
 65. See supra Section I.A.  
 66. The persistence of FIB proposals should cast doubt on the findings of credibility 
of living wills by the Federal Reserve and FDIC. The fact that regulators have found living 
wills that would utilize Chapter 11 credible, however, suggests that they are unlikely to 
suddenly find the backbone to insist that a special FIB process would not work for an 
institution that could not demonstrate the availability of committed liquidity.  
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regulatory requirements on these institutions. From the perspective of 
such big banks, living wills are potentially the most threatening tool in 
the regulatory arsenal. While regulators have not yet exercised the 
full extent of the living wills power to break up big banks, the ability 
of regulators to order divestment without additional legislative 
authorization is the single greatest threat to the banks’ business 
model of being too big to fail.  
As things currently stand, any proposal to resolve a complex 
financial institution in bankruptcy is a questionable proposition. 
There is no public law that prevents the debtor’s qualified financial 
contract (“QFC”) counterparties from running on the debtor and its 
subsidiaries upon the parent company’s bankruptcy filing. Rather, 
there is only a set of contractual provisions in the QFCs of the largest 
financial institutions that create a very limited stay.67 The stay is likely 
too short to enable a successful restructuring in most cases, and it is 
uncertain if it would even be specifically enforceable. It is even less 
certain whether the ability to enforce the contractual stay would 
prevent disruptive runs in the first place. Thus, it is easy to imagine 
foreign counterparties in particular simply grabbing collateral and 
forcing the debtor to attempt to recover it later through the slow 
engine of litigation, by which point it might be too late. 
The obstacles to resolving complex financial institutions under 
Title 11 mean that regulators currently have significant ability to 
claim that any proposed resolution plan under Title 11 is not credible, 
and thereby have the authority to impose additional discretionary 
regulatory requirements by exercising the living wills power. Having a 
specific FIB process, however, would enable the largest financial 
institutions to argue that they necessarily satisfy the living wills 
requirement because, by definition, any financial institution eligible 
for FIB could resolve itself using that process under Title 11. The 
creation of any FIB procedure would therefore deprive federal 
regulators both of a key regulatory tool for derisking the largest 
 
 67. Since 2017, federal regulations have required that all globally significant bank 
holding companies and their depository subsidiaries conform their QFCs to certain 
mandatory terms. 12 C.F.R. §	47.3(b)(1), (2) (2018) (national bank subsidiaries); id. 
§	252.82(b)(1), (2) (global systemically important banks (“GSIBs”) and member bank 
subsidiaries); id. §	382.2(b)(1), (2) (state insured bank subsidiaries). Those terms include a 
stay until the later of forty-eight hours or 5 p.m. the next business day and the applicability 
of U.S. resolution law. Id. §	47.5(g) (national bank subsidiaries); id. §	252.84(g) (GSIBs 
and member bank subsidiaries); id. §	382.4(g) (state insured bank subsidiaries). No 
equivalent requirement exists for QFCs that do not involve globally significant bank 
holding companies and their depository subsidiaries. 
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financial institutions as well as of the possibility of ultimately 
breaking up the biggest banks. And this may be precisely what some 
FIB proponents want. 
II.  IMAGINING FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY 
A. The Good Bank/Bad Bank Transaction 
An FIB process could take many forms, but any FIB process is 
likely to include certain features, and which are the focus of this 
Article. The key feature of any FIB process would likely be an asset 
sale that partitions the assets of the failed financial institution 
between a new “good bank” and the old, failed “bad bank.” In recent 
years sale-based reorganization has frequently replaced the 
traditional form of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, in which 
the reorganization is undertaken pursuant to a plan subject to a 
creditor vote and various statutory requirements.68 In the sale-based 
reorganization, some or all of the failed firm’s assets are sold, moving 
them into a new capital structure, with any remaining assets then 
liquidated in bankruptcy.69 Unlike a plan, a sale is not subject to a 
creditor vote or to the other statutory requirements for plan 
confirmation.70 
The sale-based reorganization method in bankruptcy is 
essentially the same as a long-standing bank resolution technique, 
known as a “good bank/bad bank” (“GB/BB”) structure. Although 
the terminology originated in the bank resolution context,71 the 
transaction structure is in no way specific to banks. Understanding the 
GB/BB structure is essential for understanding the practical 
difficulties with FIB as well as the policy tensions that lie within it. 
Financial institutions often run into trouble with a particular type 
of debt overhang problem: uncertain asset valuation. If a financial 
institution has assets, such as a book of mortgages or mortgage-
backed securities, whose value declined by an uncertain although 
material amount, the effect is a solvency problem for the institution. 
The valuation uncertainty means that the institution might be 
insolvent, and that will make it difficult for the institution to continue 
 
 68. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 825–27.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §	363 (2012).  
 71. See Edward D. Herlihy & Craig M. Wasserman, Making the Good Bank/Bad 
Bank Structure Work, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 1992, at 34, 34–37. 
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contracting—no one wants to assume the risk of trading with an 
insolvent financial institution.72 
A common solution for the valuation uncertainty problem is to 
divide the failed firm’s good assets from its bad ones using a GB/BB 
structure. While a GB/BB structure can be used even when there is 
no valuation uncertainty, a GB/BB structure can address valuation 
uncertainty by partitioning the assets of the financial institution 
through a sale that separates the assets of uncertain value from those 
of certain value: the “good” assets (those of certain value) are sold to 
a new entity, the “Good Bank” that serves as the acquisition vehicle 
for new equityholders.73 The Good Bank will also assume certain 
favored liabilities of the financial institution. These liabilities might be 
favored for any of the following reasons: they are necessary for the 
Good Bank to maintain the ongoing good will of certain creditors, 
such as suppliers and employees; the creditors on the favored 
liabilities are simply preferred for personal reasons, such as insiders; 
or because of the favored creditors’ political connections.  
The failed financial institution thus becomes the “Bad Bank,” as 
it is left with the “bad” assets of uncertain or negative value plus the 
proceeds of the sale transaction. The Bad Bank also remains 
obligated on the disfavored liabilities. The Bad Bank is still of 
uncertain solvency because of the uncertain valuation of the bad 
assets (and possibly of the disfavored liabilities), but the Good Bank 
is not, and that is critical. The assets of the Good Bank can be 
productively deployed because the Good Bank will not suffer from 
the debt overhang problem, so counterparties will not eschew doing 
business with it. Thus, the GB/BB format liberates the good assets 
from the bad assets and from disfavored liabilities.74 
 
 72. For example, a firm that used asbestos products in its manufacturing might have 
significant contingent liabilities. The extent and timing of the firm’s liability is currently 
unknown, but any potential liability diminishes the firm’s ability to obtain unsecured debt 
because of the possibility of large competing tort claims. 
 73. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, GOOD BANK-BAD BANK: A CLEAN BREAK AND A 
FRESH START 1–5 (2009), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/20090218goodbankbadbank.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7U3X-3YXP] (describing variations of GB/BB structures).  
 74. The single-point-of-entry (“SPOE”) mechanism that is frequently used in the 
living wills required of certain large financial institutions, 12 U.S.C. §	5365(d) (2012), is a 
GB/BB structure. In SPOE, the equity and certain debt obligations of the debtor holding 
company are left behind with any undesirable assets, while the good assets are transferred 
to a new holding company along with other (favored) liabilities. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM 10–11 
(2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/OLA_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2DPG-5XHG]. While SPOE often focuses on the equity and long-term debt of the debtor 
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A GB/BB structure can be implemented in a variety of ways, 
including in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, a GB/BB structure is 
implemented through a sale of the Good Bank assets under §	363(b) 
and (f) of the Bankruptcy Code,75 presumably prior to the 
confirmation of a bankruptcy plan. The Bad Bank assets are then 
subsequently liquidated pursuant to a plan of liquidation. Such a 
format capitalizes on the speed of bankruptcy sales, which must be 
held “after notice and a hearing,” a phrase defined to mean only such 
notice and hearing as is appropriate under the circumstances, and 
which may mean that no notice or hearing is required if time is of the 
essence.76 Thus, if the Good Bank assets are flighty customer 
relationships—the financial institution equivalent of melting ice 
cream—they are preserved through a fast sale.77 Moreover, the 
ultimate liquidation of the Bad Bank is largely done automatically by 
adherence to the liquidation priorities in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, even 
if the liquidation is carried out in Chapter 11.78 Creditors have few 
grounds and even less reason to attempt to hold up the post-sale 
liquidation, because they cannot use it to unwind the prior asset sale.79 
For the GB/BB structure to work, however, two conditions must 
hold. First, creditors must be prevented from undertaking collection 
actions while the asset sale is pending, or else the sale may fall apart 
as key assets might no longer be available for creditors. In bankruptcy 
the automatic stay generally prevents such creditor actions, except in 
the case of certain financial contracts; swaps, repos, securities and 
commodities futures contracts, forward contracts, and master netting 
agreements may all be terminated, accelerated, and liquidated 
without running afoul of the automatic stay.80 This presents few 
obstacles for most debtors, but is an issue for financial institution 
debtors as discussed below. 
 
holding company getting “bailed-in”—that is, left behind—the key to SPOE is really in the 
selective transfer of favored assets and liabilities to a new firm, which is just the GB/BB 
structure. 
 75. 11 U.S.C. §	363(b), (f) (2012). 
 76. See id. §	102(1). 
 77. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of 
Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 866–67 (2014).  
 78. 11 U.S.C. §§	725–726 (2012) (Chapter 7 distribution baseline); id. 
§	1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring a Chapter 11 plan to, at a minimum, adhere to the Chapter 7 
distribution limits).  
 79. See id. §	363(m) (providing that the “reversal or modification on appeal” of a sale 
order “does not affect the validity of a sale .	.	. to an entity that purchased .	.	. in good 
faith”). 
 80. Id. §	362(b)(6)–(7), (17), (27); id. §§	555, 559–561. 
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Second, the asset purchaser—the Good Bank—must have 
confidence in the valuation of the assets it purchases. If the assets’ 
value is too uncertain, a buyer would be unlikely to step forward. One 
way around this problem is by enabling prospective buyers to have 
sufficient time to conduct due diligence on the assets, such that they 
can come up with a valuation on which to base a bid. But if time is of 
the essence with the GB/BB transaction—the ice cream is melting—
then such diligence will not be possible. In such a case, either the 
purchase price would be severely depressed or the transaction would 
not happen, unless a third-party would be willing to guarantee the 
purchased assets. The automatic stay generally provides the breathing 
room for the necessary diligence to occur. But, as noted above, the 
stay does much less work for financial institution debtors. 
The result of a GB/BB structure is that the holders of the favored 
liabilities assumed by the Good Bank would be paid in full, so long as 
the Good Bank remains solvent. The holders of the disfavored 
liabilities, however, recover in bankruptcy only from the bad assets 
and the sale proceeds from the good assets. This means that the risk 
of loss on the bad assets, as well as the risk of underpricing the good 
assets, lies with the creditors who hold the disfavored liabilities. A 
GB/BB structure thus operates as a type of priority system that 
ensures 100% repayment for favored liabilities and does not 
guarantee any particular repayment for disfavored liabilities. 
For example, suppose that a bankrupt company has $150 of 
assets and $300 in total liabilities as follows: $100 to a class of 
unsecured bondholders, $100 to a class of tort claimants, and $100 to 
a class of employees. These three classes of claims are all general 
unsecured claims of equal priority and should be paid out pro rata in 
a bankruptcy liquidation, with all three classes receiving 50¢ on the 
dollar.81 
Suppose then that the assets were purchased by a third party. If 
the third party paid fair market value in cash for the assets—$150—
there would be no effect on the distribution to the creditors. The old 
assets would simply have been transformed into cash from other 
forms of property. The plain asset sale does not change the 
distribution. The creditors would assume the risk, however, that the 
sale is underpriced. If the assets are really worth $200, then they 
should receive a 66.7% dividend. Of course, if the assets are really 
worth $200, then one would expect another buyer—perhaps a 
 
 81. See id. §	726(b). 
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creditor—to bid more than $150 for them, but this presupposes no 
limitations on bidding procedures and other transactional and 
informational frictions. 
Now, however, suppose that the purchaser wants to keep the 
existing workforce and wants to ensure labor peace. The purchaser 
therefore reduces its offer from $150 in cash to an offer of only $50 in 
cash and the assumption of the $100 in employee claims. If the 
purchase is approved, the debtor would be left with $50 in assets and 
$200 in claims, so the bondholders and tort claimants are paid 25¢ on 
the dollar. In contrast, the employees’ claims would be assumed by a 
solvent third-party purchaser, so they would be paid in full, 100¢ on 
the dollar. The assumption of liabilities in the asset purchase 
effectively gives the employees priority over the bondholders and tort 
claimants despite all parties formally having the same priority. 
Finally, assume that there is some uncertainty about the 
valuation of some of the assets. The buyer might be willing to assume 
the valuation risk on those assets, but if the buyer purchases only the 
good assets, then the remaining assets—and the valuation 
uncertainty—remain with the creditors whose claims were not 
assumed in the sale. In other words, the valuation risk not just of the 
sale price but also of the remaining assets is concentrated on the 
bondholders and tort claimants. The employees, whose claims the 
buyer assumed, have escaped the risk of an underpriced sale as well 
as the valuation risk of the assets left behind. 
The GB/BB structure is already the preferred transactional form 
for many large, nonfinancial business bankruptcies. Many large 
bankruptcies now use an asset sale, rather than a plan, as their 
primary means of effectuating a reorganization.82 Some version of a 
GB/BB structure would likely be used in an FIB for two reasons. 
First, the GB/BB structure allows for the quick redeployment of 
the good assets, which is important to minimize disruptive spillover 
effects. A GB/BB transaction has both a sale and a subsequent 
liquidating plan, but the key part of the transaction is the sale; it is not 
critical that the liquidating plan be achieved with particular alacrity. 
Indeed, the GB/BB approach effectively divides the bankruptcy 
process into two parts: an asset sale process that supposedly 
maximizes the value of the debtor’s assets, followed by a separate, 
subsequent process for evaluating claims and distributing value to 
allowed claims. The former is a process that has little role for a judge, 
 
 82. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 825–27. 
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while the latter is an adjudicative process in terms of claims 
evaluation. Distribution, however, may then be done robotically 
according to a statutory cashflow waterfall. 
The alternative to a sale followed by a plan-based liquidation is a 
plan-based reorganization. The timeline for a plan in an FIB need not 
follow the current Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 
Nonetheless, any sort of plan-based reorganization would necessarily 
be slower than the sale component of a GB/BB transaction because a 
plan-based reorganization must provide some time for dissemination 
and consideration of a disclosure statement,83 as well as for voting 
(meaning dissemination of ballots and counting of ballots cast), a 
confirmation hearing, and a post-confirmation appellate period.84 
Second, in contrast to a bankruptcy plan, a sale is not a 
procedure that is vulnerable to holdouts, at least under current 
bankruptcy law. Consensual confirmation of a bankruptcy plan 
requires obtaining consent of the majorities of all impaired classes of 
claims and interests,85 as well as satisfaction of a number of other 
statutory requirements.86 A bankruptcy plan may also be confirmed 
via the “cramdown” procedure with consent of only a single impaired 
class (excluding insiders).87 Neither type of confirmation, however, 
may happen as quickly as needed. In contrast, the standards for a 
preplan asset sale are much looser; no creditor consent whatsoever is 
required, and the debtor merely has to show an “articulated business 
justification.”88 
B. The Resolution Dilemma: Reducing Moral Hazard or Reducing 
Systemic Spillovers 
FIB proposals seek to simultaneously achieve two irreconcilable 
goals. On the one hand, FIB proposals seek to reduce moral hazard 
 
 83. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a) (requiring twenty-eight days’ notice before a 
disclosure statement hearing). 
 84. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3020(e) (requiring a fourteen-day delay after a plan is 
confirmed before it is effective, which matches the fourteen-day window for filing an 
appeal under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002(a)(1)). 
 85. 11 U.S.C. §§	1126(c), 1129(a)(7) (2012). 
 86. Id. §	1129(a). 
 87. Id. §	1129(b). 
 88. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1070–71 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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by forcing creditor loss internalization.89 If creditors incur losses as a 
result of poor lending decisions, they will be incentivized to take more 
care in the future. Conversely, if creditors are bailed out of their bad 
deals, they have no incentive to take care, as they are left with a 
“heads I win, tails you lose” bargain. Thus, to reduce moral hazard, it 
is imperative that creditors (or at least adjusting ones) bear losses in 
an FIB (or at least that they credibly believe that they will bear 
losses). The whole point of the moral hazard reduction is to 
encourage better ex ante behavior by creditors; it is not meant to be 
punitive. In a GB/BB transaction, loss internalization can be achieved 
by leaving creditors’ obligations behind in the Bad Bank. 
At the same time, however, FIB seeks to ensure a “smooth 
landing” for the economy by minimizing the spillovers from the 
failure of a large financial institution.90 The failure of a large financial 
institution can result in a domino chain of failures as questions of 
solvency metastasize throughout the financial system. A GB/BB 
transaction can be used to achieve such a smooth landing and head 
off spillovers by having the Good Bank assume creditors’ obligations. 
If the goal is to eliminate moral hazard, it is necessary for 
bankruptcy to impose losses on creditors that can adjust ex ante. Yet 
the most certain way to prevent such spillovers is to ensure that 
creditors do not incur losses in a bankruptcy. This means it is not 
possible to simultaneously prevent moral hazard and prevent 
spillovers in regard to the same creditor. In a bankruptcy, either the 
creditor will bear losses or it will not. 
One way around this conundrum is to differentiate between 
types of creditors—some creditors will bear losses and provide the 
market discipline that will limit future bank risk-taking, while others 
will not bear losses and will be effectively bailed out because the 
Good Bank will assume their obligations. Such a differentiation of 
creditors is politically problematic. It means picking winners and 
losers, an issue FIB supporters avoid discussing entirely, because the 
moral hazard problem they seek to eliminate will persist if any 
 
 89. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1667, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of John B. Taylor, 
Professor, Stanford University) (“Chapter 11 ensures that creditors bear losses and this 
reduces moral hazard and excessive risk-taking.”).  
 90. See, e.g., id. (“The goal of these provisions is to let a failing financial firm go into 
bankruptcy in a predictable, rules-based manner without causing disruptive spillovers in 
the economy while permitting people to continue to use its financial services without 
running.”). 
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creditors have their obligations assumed (or even think that they will 
have their obligations assumed). 
Consumers, tax authorities, tort creditors, and vendors are 
basically nonadjusting creditors, so it makes no sense to place losses 
on them because they do not present a moral hazard problem. That 
leaves as the adjusting creditors only the financial creditors, such as 
unsecured bond debt, any secured debt, and repo and derivatives 
counterparties. Yet these financial creditors are exactly whom we are 
most worried about being the channel for a domino effect of failures 
throughout the economy. Protecting these financial creditors, or a 
subset of them, is exactly the type of crony capitalism problem that 
bailout critics raise. There is no way to both create market discipline 
and prevent domino effects that cascade throughout the economy. 
Ultimately, a choice must be made. This is the “resolution dilemma.” 
The choice should be easy: reduce the economic dislocation 
caused by the failure of a financial institution. Market discipline is a 
wonderful thing, but it should not become a fetish. It is not an end in 
and of itself but rather a means toward achieving greater economic 
stability. There are other tools available for reducing excessive risk-
taking by financial institutions—namely, prudential regulation. 
Prudential regulatory regimes are not fail-safe, and particular features 
may impose costs that outweigh their benefits. But given the difficulty 
in credibly committing ex ante to impose losses on creditors no matter 
the economic consequences, prudential regulation is the only realistic 
alternative. No matter how many laws proclaim “no bailouts,” no one 
believes that the government will follow through when doing so 
becomes an economic suicide pact. 
Once we recognize the resolution dilemma, however, one has to 
ask: Why bother with the bankruptcy? To the extent that a 
bankruptcy system protects creditors from incurring losses, it is just 
another form of a bailout, hiding in bankruptcy’s clothing. If the 
reluctant choice is to go with bailouts, why try to disguise them in the 
garb of bankruptcy? Let the wolf come as a wolf, not in sheep’s garb. 
One could make a more sophisticated argument that using a 
bankruptcy procedure will create the impression, or at least 
uncertainty about the likelihood, that there will be loss internalization 
even if there ultimately will not be, and this deke will improve market 
discipline. While this is not an argument actually made by FIB 
proponents, it has some virtue. The uncertainty would reduce moral 
hazard without having to surrender the smooth landing when a 
financial institution actually fails. Yet such an argument relies on 
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sophisticated financial institutions being snookered by the system’s 
design, and if they are not fooled, they will double down on reckless 
lending. Moreover, it is an argument for completely cynical 
legislation—for creating an FIB regime not intended for actual use 
but instead to scare bank counterparties that it could be used. This 
argument also runs against the concern about lack of transparency in 
bailouts: What is less transparent than disguising a bailout as a 
bankruptcy? The tension between reducing moral hazard and 
reducing spillover effects points to the pointlessness of financial 
institution bankruptcy. 
III.  THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
BANKRUPTCY 
Beyond the conceptual problem inherent in a GB/BB framework 
for restructuring a financial institution in bankruptcy, there are also 
four core practical obstacles: the inability to obtain adequate 
financing for a restructuring; problems with international 
coordination; the difficulty of dealing with derivatives and other 
financial contracts; and the lack of a mechanism for addressing 
valuation uncertainty for potential Good Bank purchasers. Any one 
of these obstacles alone should throw cold water on dreams of FIB. 
Together, however, they show that a private FIB process is a fantasy. 
FIB can only possibly work with massive government involvement, at 
which point its supposed virtues dissipate and it compares less 
favorably to bailouts, whether executed ad hoc or through a 
previously authorized administrative device like OLA. 
A. DIP Financing Is Not Feasible for Large Financial Institutions 
1.  Normal Sources of DIP Financing Will Not Be Available 
For a debtor to have any chance of successfully restructuring 
itself in bankruptcy, it must have adequate liquidity to pay its 
operating costs. The debtor needs to have the cash to keep the lights 
on, retain employees, maintain insurance coverage, pay taxes, and 
more. 
For a financial institution, such liquidity demands are even 
greater. Financial institutions trade on trust and confidence. 
Counterparties will enter into contracts with these institutions only if 
they feel reasonably confident that the financial institution will meet 
its obligations. For a financial institution to operate, it must 
constantly be able to access the market. For example, if a bank were 
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to make a fixed-rate loan, it also would have to be able to access 
interest rate swap markets to hedge its interest rate risk. But if swap 
counterparties do not think the bank will be able to honor its 
commitment on the swap, they will not contract with it. 
This means that, for a financial institution to continue operating 
in bankruptcy, it must have essentially the level of liquidity that it 
would have if it were not financially distressed. Anything less will 
result in a self-fulfilling prophecy of a run, as creditors will raise 
prices, demand more collateral, or refuse to roll over debts because of 
a lack of confidence in the survival of the debtor. This is precisely 
what occurred with Lehman Brothers in 2008—its clearing bank, 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (“JPMorgan”), demanded that Lehman post 
more collateral.91 And, as the 2008 crisis clearly demonstrated, the 
liquidity demands on a financial institution in bankruptcy will be 
extraordinary.92 
Yet the nature of most debtor firms is that they lack liquidity 
when they file for bankruptcy. Most firms do not file for bankruptcy 
until they absolutely have to do so. They will only file when there is 
an acute liquidity crisis pending, such that they will not be able to 
make a debt payment or meet payroll. 
There is every reason to think the same would be true with 
financial institutions. As long as a financial institution is liquid, it can 
keep operating even if insolvent. Indeed, the financial institution’s 
management would be strongly incentivized to do so, as management 
loses nothing by “gambling on resurrection.”93 If the company’s 
fortunes turn around, everything would return to normal, the firm’s 
equity retains value, and the managers are heroes for fixing the 
company. If the firm still fails, the managers have not lost shareholder 
 
 91. See, e.g., Jonathan Stempel, JPMorgan to Pay $1.42 Billion Cash to Settle Most 
Lehman Claims, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2016, 9:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
jpmorgan-lehman-idUSKCN0V4049 [http://perma.cc/SNU5-ZMXS]. 
 92. Large financial institutions are already subject to a “liquidity coverage ratio” 
intended to ensure that they will not find themselves pressed for liquidity. 12 C.F.R. 
§	50.10 (2018) (covering national banks); id. §	249.10 (covering insured state banks); id. 
§	329.10 (covering state member banks). But if the liquidity coverage ratio is simply the 
financial regulatory equivalent of building a higher levy, it is always vulnerable to being 
wiped out by a strong enough hurricane, or here, financial crisis. See Adam J. Levitin, 
Prioritization and Mutualization: Clearinghouses and the Redundancy of the Bankruptcy 
Safe Harbors, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 129, 139 (2015) [hereinafter Levitin, 
Prioritization and Mutualization]. 
 93. See LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 315. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 243 (2019) 
2019] FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY 273 
 
funds but value that would otherwise go to creditors.94 It is possible, 
of course, to conceive of an FIB regime that permits the filing of an 
involuntary petition, perhaps triggered by regulatory action. But 
there is a real possibility that regulators will be reluctant to pull the 
trigger lest they do so prematurely, with the result that they pull it too 
late and face a worse crisis than otherwise. 
Thus, by the time a financial institution ends up in bankruptcy, it 
would likely have very little liquidity, probably not enough to keep 
operating. To the extent it still has enough liquidity to operate, it 
would assuredly evaporate as creditors (particularly those funding 
repo lines of credit) demand payment on existing obligations and 
refuse to extend new credit out of fear that the debtor would lack the 
liquid funds to pay on its obligations as they come due. 
The liquidity crisis a financial institution is likely to face when it 
files for bankruptcy necessitates a fresh source of liquidity. In this 
regard, an FIB is not materially different from any other business 
bankruptcy. In a typical business bankruptcy, the debtor will address 
the liquidity problem by obtaining DIP financing—a new, post-
petition financing facility that will provide the debtor with the funds 
to continue operations.95 
Adequate DIP financing, however, is not possible for a financial 
institution of any size.96 An enormous DIP financing facility would be 
required for a financial institution, far more than for a Main Street 
company such as a manufacturer. Moreover, particularly for a 
financial institution whose ability to do business depends on 
customers’ confidence in its ability to honor its commitments, a DIP 
financing facility would need to be in place immediately, on day one 
of the case. Without a DIP facility in place at the time of filing, 
counterparties would flee a financial institution, resulting in a self-
 
 94. Notably, corporate law in most states imposes no liability on corporate directors 
and officers for gambling on resurrection. Directors do not bear fiduciary duties to 
creditors, see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
99 (Del. 2007), and Delaware does not recognize the tort of “deepening insolvency,” 
Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff’d 
sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007). 
 95. See LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 389–90, 397–98.  
 96. This fact alone should call into question the credibility of all resolution plans filed 
under the Dodd-Frank Act’s living wills provision. 12 U.S.C. §	5365(d) (2012). As noted 
above, however, the purpose of the living wills requirement may be less about ensuring 
that living wills are actually credible than about giving regulators extra discretion to 
impose additional regulatory requirements on the largest financial institutions, including 
the option of breaking up these institutions. See supra Section I.D. 
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fulfilling collapse. Both requirements present insurmountable 
problems. 
A large financial institution would require a DIP facility of tens if 
not hundreds of billions of dollars. JPMorgan, for example, has 
around $560 billion in high quality liquid assets that cover peak short-
term cash outflows.97 To maintain counterparty confidence to 
continue operations and not cause a creditor run, a firm like 
JPMorgan would need to maintain its nondistressed level of liquidity, 
in this case around $560 billion. Similarly, Bank of America and 
Citigroup would each require around $425 billion in liquidity to 
maintain their nondistressed financial profile,98 while Goldman Sachs 
would require $210 billion.99 While a financial institution would not 
enter bankruptcy with zero liquidity, it is not likely to enter into 
bankruptcy until its liquidity position is dire, so it would likely still 
need a liquidity source for a substantial portion of its predistressed 
liquidity level, likely in the tens of billions of dollars if not more. 
Private lending markets are not capable of providing such large 
amounts of liquidity to a bankrupt firm, even for a very short period 
of time. The largest private syndicated loan in history, $75 billion, was 
raised in November 2015 for AB InBev’s takeover bid for SABMiller, 
but that syndicate took weeks to assemble for a solvent firm.100 A 
failed megabank does not have the luxury of that time. 
Perhaps the best yardstick is past DIP lending. The largest 
private DIP financing ever assembled was a mere $9 billion loan for 
 
 97. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO DISCLOSURE: FOR 




 98. BANK OF AM., PILLAR 3 U.S. LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO (LCR) 
DISCLOSURES: FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2017, at 4, http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9Mzg3MTU1fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT
0z&t=1&cb=636391143557193311 [http://perma.cc/85XV-PQ3K]; CITIGROUP, INC., U.S. 
LCR DISCLOSURE: FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 6/30/17, at 2, 
https://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/data/lcr170630.pdf?ieNocache=165https://bit.ly/
2Ms5Lra [http://perma.cc/X69Q-TG64]. 
 99. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO DISCLOSURE: FOR 
THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2017, at 2, https://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-
relations/financials/archived/other-information/2q-2017-liquidity-coverage-ratio.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/R3BM-4CHT]. 
 100. Alasdair Reilly & Tessa Walsh, AB InBev Backs SABMiller Buy with Record $75 
Billion Loan, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2015, 6:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
abinbev-loans/ab-inbev-backs-sabmiller-buy-with-record-75-billion-loan-idUSKCN0T01
9E20151111 [http://perma.cc/8BZW-CJGE]. 
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Energy Future Holdings in 2014.101 Even the U.S. government’s DIP 
loan to GM, the largest DIP loan ever, was only $33 billion.102 None 
of these past DIP loans come close to approaching the level of DIP 
financing a large financial institution would require to continue 
operating in bankruptcy. Furthermore, the emergency nature of DIP 
liquidity provision would preclude syndication because of the time 
needed to market the loan (here, in secrecy) to potential syndicate 
members, each of which would have to conduct its own diligence. 
DIP loans are also almost always first lien, superpriority loans. 
No DIP lender wants to lend on an unsecured basis because the 
borrower is, by definition, bankrupt and a serious credit risk. A 
bankrupt financial institution would be hard-pressed to offer a new 
DIP-lending consortium for unencumbered collateral, as most 
valuable assets would likely already be pledged.  
Bankruptcy law contemplates the possibility of priming liens for 
DIP loans,103 meaning that the DIP loans would get a lien with 
priority over existing liens. Such priming liens, however, would likely 
be bitterly contested. At the very least, approval of priming liens 
would require a lengthy valuation hearing, delaying the financing, as 
well as evidence that the debtor had tried and failed to find financing 
on other terms.104 
Further complicating DIP financing for complex bankruptcies is 
that it must be arranged in advance to be available at the start of a 
case. Large, multibillion-dollar loans are never made by single 
institutions. Instead, they are syndicated facilities in which numerous 
financial institutions each provide the funding for a part of the 
facility.105 Lining up a syndicate, much less one so large, takes time. 
The $75 billion loan for AB InBev took weeks to arrange for a 
solvent firm.106 
A financial institution, however, does not have the luxury of 
time. First, it might be in trouble in part because of market-wide 
 
 101. Billy Cheung, Energy Future Holdings Lining Up $9 Billion Bankruptcy 
Financing, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014, 9:35 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
energy-future-hd-loans/energy-future-holdings-lining-up-9-billion-bankruptcy-financing-id
USBREA2Q13020140327 [http://perma.cc/M7CN-RA6R]. 
 102. Id.; Christine Caufield, GM Gets OK to Tap $33.3B in DIP Financing, LAW360 
(June 25, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/articles/108332/gm-gets-ok-
to-tap-33-3b-in-dip-financing [http://perma.cc/AE69-DAHV (dark archive)]. 
 103. 11 U.S.C. §	364(d)(1) (2012). 
 104. See id. 
 105. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 71–75. 
 106. Reilly & Walsh, supra note 100. 
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problems. If markets have frozen, DIP financing will not be available. 
And the failure of a large financial institution is itself likely to result 
in a market freeze. Second, DIP financing would likely come from 
other financial institutions—the failed institution’s current 
counterparties because nearly all large financial institutions trade 
with each other. As soon as a firm began to attempt securing DIP 
financing, it would be advertising to its creditors that it will be filing 
for bankruptcy, which would precipitate a run on the firm, resulting in 
a premature bankruptcy. 
Private capital markets are simply incapable of coming up with 
enormous liquidity for a potentially insolvent company, much less 
overnight and when markets are in turmoil. Now consider the 
possibility that multiple financial institutions fail simultaneously, as 
occurred in 2008. There’s simply no chance of adequate DIP financing 
from the private sector. 
2.  Alternative Sources of DIP Financing Are Problematic 
The federal government could, in theory, provide the massive 
DIP financing required with the necessary limited notice to creditors, 
but the whole point of FIB proposals is to keep the government out of 
the process and let the restructuring be a private ordering. Once the 
government is involved, it will assuredly flex its muscles and insist on 
favorable terms for its loan or for favorable treatment for particular, 
politically favored creditors. If OLA is any guide, none of this would 
be restricted by statute, not least because no one wants to constrain 
the flexibility of a response ex ante without knowing the particular 
circumstances involved. Even if there were statutory restrictions, 
however, there would be strong pressure to figure out a way around 
them in the FIB procedure or else FIB simply would not be used for 
resolution. Instead, the terms of the DIP loan would be contractually 
determined and presented to the court for approval on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. The court’s only option when faced with such terms is 
to approve them because denying the DIP loan means triggering a 
serious financial crisis, something no judge wants to do.107 It is hard to 
see an FIB operating without government DIP lending, which 
undermines the entire point of FIB. 
It is true that an FIB with a GB/BB structure could take the form 
of a very quick asset sale (and liability assumption) from the failed 
financial institution to some buyer, and that buyer might agree to 
 
 107. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 8, at 290. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 243 (2019) 
2019] FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY 277 
 
supply liquidity during the interim before the sale’s closing. But 
consider who the buyers might be. To swallow up the good assets of a 
large financial institution—an institution that might have tens of 
billions if not hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars in 
assets—a buyer would need to be of similar or greater size. For 
example, as of the end of 2017, JPMorgan reported assets of just more 
than $2.5 trillion,108 while Citigroup reported assets of around $1.8 
trillion.109 There are few such buyers around to begin with, and in a 
global financial crisis, the potential buyers would themselves possibly 
be in financial difficulty or reluctant to assume additional risk, much 
less without the opportunity for serious diligence. Thus, in the 2008 
crisis, Lehman Brothers was unable to find a buyer.110 The shotgun 
marriages between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan 
and Washington Mutual, JPMorgan and Bear Stearns, and Wells 
Fargo and Wachovia were all done with a heavy (and sometimes 
heavy-handed) dose of governmental involvement.111 And those deals 
sometimes included government loss-sharing agreements,112 which is 
presumably anathema to FIB proponents because of its supposed 
private-ordering virtues and lack of involvement of the public fisc. 
 
 108. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2018), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/annualreport-2017.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/TCC8-2B94]. 
 109. CITIGROUP, INC., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.citigroup.com/citi/
investor/quarterly/2018/ar17_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3SU-7HXZ]. 
 110. Robert J. Samuelson, Opinion, Lehman Brothers Collapsed 10 Years Ago. Whose 
Fault Was It?, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
lehman-brothers-collapsed-10-years-ago-whose-fault-was-it/2018/08/26/79137b2e-a7dd-11e8-
a656-943eefab5daf_story.html?utm_term=.1d4386b06a93 [https://perma.cc/39P6-7LXC]. 
 111. William D. Cohan, The Final Days of Merrill Lynch, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2009), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/09/the-final-days-of-merrill-lynch/307621/ 
[https://perma.cc/43C4-ZRKJ]; David Ellis & Jeanne Sahadi, JPMorgan Buys WaMu, 
CNN: MONEY (Sept. 26, 2008, 12:18 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2008/09/25/news/
companies/JPM_WaMu/ [https://perma.cc/Q7ZM-VAMD]; Sara Lepro & Jennifer Malloy 
Zonnas, Wells Fargo Buys Wachovia for $15.1 Billion, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2008), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/SmartHome/story?id=5946486&page=1 [https://perma.cc/
MU5K-VQVC]; Liz Moyer, A Decade After its Fire-Sale Deal for Bear, a Look at What JP 
Morgan Got in the Bargain, CNBC (Mar. 16, 2018, 7:13 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/03/14/a-decade-after-its-fire-sale-deal-for-bear-a-look-at-what-jp-morgan-got-in-the-
bargain.html [https://perma.cc/AC62-G3VS]. 
 112. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns Announce Amended Merger 
Agreement and Agreement for JPMorgan Chase to Purchase 39.5% of Bear Stearns, SEC. 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 24, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/
000089882208000320/pressrelease.htm [http://perma.cc/F4C9-NVXE] (noting that the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York was assuming any losses on the $30 billion purchase 
beyond the first $1 billion of losses). 
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Another possibility would be a standby DIP facility for financial 
institutions. No financial institution would willingly pay for such a 
facility in part because the lack of a DIP lending facility and thus the 
unavailability of a viable bankruptcy process increases the likelihood 
of a bailout, so it would have to be required by regulation. 
Conceptually such a facility is possible with a credit-linked note 
structure.113 First, a financial institution sponsor could create a 
special-purpose entity (“SPE”). The SPE would then issue notes and 
escrow the investment proceeds from the note, investing the proceeds 
in liquid, safe assets like Treasury securities. The SPE would also 
enter into a swap with the financial institution that would be triggered 
by the financial institution’s bankruptcy filing. Until the financial 
institution filed for bankruptcy, it would make periodic payments to 
the SPE. The SPE would in turn pay the noteholders, who would also 
receive the investment earnings on the escrowed funds. Upon a 
bankruptcy filing, however, the flow of funds would reverse: the SPE 
would pay out the escrowed funds to the financial institution in the 
form of a pre-negotiated DIP facility. 
While credit-linked notes are a common financing structure, they 
have never before been used for a DIP lending facility, and such a 
facility would not be cheap. Credit-linked notes would function as a 
type of insurance for a financial institution to ensure that it would 
have funding in the event that it failed. If the financial institution filed 
for bankruptcy, then the DIP facility would be funded automatically, 
like an insurance payment triggered by a loss. The periodic payments 
to the SPE are essentially insurance premiums for DIP lending 
insurance. If this process was workable, it would add substantial costs 
to running a financial institution simply by virtue of the volume of 
credit-linked notes that would have to be issued. Such cost might in 
fact be desirable if the credit-linked note requirement were triggered 
only upon a certain size or complexity threshold. A regulatory 
requirement of a standby DIP facility through credit-linked notes 
would serve as a type of tax on systemically important financial 
institutions, which would create an incentive for those firms to reduce 
their size and complexity. But all this presupposes that there would 
even be a market for such credit-linked notes. 
 
 113. For a description of credit-linked notes, see William W. Bratton & Adam J. 
Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to 
Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 852 (2013). 
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One can get some sense of market appetite for this sort of credit 
risk by looking at the market for catastrophe bonds. Catastrophe 
bonds are a type of security that provides a capital-market-funded 
type of insurance for firms concerned about exposure to natural 
disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes.114 The bonds work 
similarly to credit-linked notes, where a transaction sponsor forms an 
SPE with no assets or noncontractual liabilities. The SPE then issues 
catastrophe bonds; the investors in the bonds have no recourse 
against the sponsor, only against the SPE. The funds used by investors 
to pay for the bonds are held in escrow by the SPE. If a specified 
catastrophe event does not occur, the funds remain in escrow, and the 
investors receive periodic interest payments from the transaction 
sponsor plus the investment earnings on the escrowed funds. The 
escrowed funds are ultimately returned when principal payments are 
due on the bonds. If a specified catastrophe does occur, however, the 
escrowed funds are released by the SPE to the transaction’s sponsor. 
Because the bonds are nonrecourse against the sponsor, the effect of 
the release of the escrowed funds to the sponsor is that the 
catastrophe bond investors will incur a loss; the SPE has no other 
assets to repay the bondholders. Thus, the catastrophe bond investors 
assume the risk of the catastrophe up to the level of their investment. 
Catastrophe bonds tend to be issued by reinsurance companies 
as a way of using capital markets to reinsure the risks they have 
assumed.115 The total global catastrophe bond market has never had 
more than $31 billion of bonds outstanding, and issuance has never 
exceeded $12.5 billion per year in a market where there is unlikely to 
be substantial correlations between catastrophes.116 For example, a 
hurricane in the Caribbean is not correlated with an earthquake in 
California. 
Another measure of market appetite for this type of risk is the 
market for contingent convertible (“co-co”) bonds. Co-cos are a type 
of “bail-in-able” capital—debt that converts to equity upon the 
occurrence of a specified trigger event. The conversion de-levers the 
 
 114. For a general description of catastrophe bonds, see Thomas Berghman, Note, A 
Market Under(writing) the Weather: A Recommendation to Increase Insurer Capacity, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 221, 250–51 (2013). 
 115. See James Ming Chen, Correlation, Coverage, and Catastrophe: The Contours of 
Financial Preparedness for Disaster, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 56, 70 (2014). 
 116. Catastrophe Bonds and ILS Issued and Outstanding by Year, ARTEMIS, 
http://www.artemis.bm/deal_directory/cat_bonds_ils_issued_outstanding.html [http://perma.cc/
2UMC-395U]. 
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debtor, immediately increasing its solvency. It also helps the debtor’s 
liquidity as the conversion reduces its debt service. Such co-co bonds 
are fairly popular among European banks, but the total amount 
outstanding has never exceeded $140 billion.117 Critically, co-cos do 
not themselves provide liquidity to the debtor upon conversion. They 
simply change where they sit in the debtor’s capital structure. 
Nonetheless, they provide a measure for the appetite among investors 
for assuming credit risk on large financial institutions. 
The largest financial institutions in the United States would 
require a couple magnitudes more of credit-linked notes than the 
entire catastrophe bond market or co-co bond market to finance a 
bankruptcy. JPMorgan alone, for example, would need up to $560 
billion of liquidity support.118 Given the high correlation risk between 
credit-linked notes for large financial institutions, it is doubtful that 
there would be sufficient demand from global credit markets for such 
credit-linked notes to be sellable at a nonprohibitive rate. 
Ultimately, if a firm is too big to finance in bankruptcy or “too 
big to DIP,” it’s also too big to fail. If the private market cannot 
provide the DIP financing, that is a strong indicator that the firm is 
systemically important.119 
There is only one source in the world capable of credibly 
providing a DIP loan of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars with 
minimal notice. That is the U.S. government. No other entity in the 
world has this sort of financial strength. Yet it is inconceivable to 
imagine the federal government acting as a DIP lender without 
attaching strings to the extension of credit, such as demanding 
particular treatments for favored creditor constituencies.120 And that 
 
 117. Justin Yang, Co-Co Bond Market Pulls Through Recent Setbacks, WALL ST. J. 
(June 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coco-bond-market-pulls-through-recent-
setbacks-1498477962 [http://perma.cc/VU7M-SWYS (dark archive)]. That total is likely 
inflated in part because it reflects the relatively high yields on co-cos in a low interest rate 
environment. When rates rise, investors seeking to achieve certain return hurdles will have 
more options for higher-yielding investments and thus less interest in co-cos. 
 118. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., supra note 97, at 1. 
 119. Indeed, this suggests that perhaps bankruptcy could be used as a systemic risk 
shibboleth: if a firm is capable of prearranging standing DIP financing on a level that 
regulators believe is sufficient (presumably its maximum liquidity needs over the past 
several years), then bankruptcy might be a reasonable regime for the firm. But if the firm 
is too big to DIP, then it is also too big to fail and should be dealt with outside a 
bankruptcy regime. 
 120. In theory, conditions for DIP lending could be legislated, but it is difficult to do ex 
ante, and any such legislation would likely have a hydraulic effect on contractual terms—
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takes us right back to the bailout situation, which has simply been 
moved into the bankruptcy system. 
B. Lack of International Coordination Will Frustrate Financial 
Institution Bankruptcy 
A second problem an FIB would face is international 
coordination, most critically because of a lack of agreement about loss 
distribution.121 Large financial firms often operate internationally and 
have cross-border assets that may be a critical component of a 
financial firm’s value. Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a 
voluntary mechanism for international coordination between U.S. 
and foreign insolvency proceedings.122 The coordination at issue in a 
U.S. FIB may well be with other foreign regulatory processes rather 
than with bankruptcy, and foreign financial regulators are hardly 
guaranteed to cooperate with a U.S. bankruptcy court. 
Foreign regulators are likely to face domestic political pressure 
to ringfence the assets of the debtor firm’s foreign affiliates, meaning 
that they would not make these assets available to support U.S. 
creditors’ claims.123 In such a case, substantial going-concern value 
could be lost as foreign creditors dismantle the financial institution’s 
foreign assets. 
C. Financial Contract Safe Harbors Will Frustrate Financial 
Institution Bankruptcy 
Large financial institutions have substantial books of QFCs. All 
of these financial instruments are potentially valuable assets. As 
 
to the extent that one term is forbidden, it will likely be recreated synthetically through 
other terms. 
 121. See Anna Gelpern, Common Capital: A Thought Experiment in Cross-Border 
Resolution, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355, 372 (2014); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, SIFIs and States, 
49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 327, 347–48 (2014). 
 122. 11 U.S.C. §	1501(a) (2012). Chapter 15 authorizes the filing of an “ancillary case” 
by a foreign representative—such as a foreign trustee or court—to seek U.S. recognition 
of a “foreign proceeding.” Id. §	1504. If granted, the U.S. automatic stay immediately 
comes into effect, and the foreign representative is authorized to operate the U.S. debtor’s 
business in the ordinary course. Id. §§	1520(a), 362(a). Additionally, Chapter 15 enables 
U.S. bankruptcy trustees to be authorized “to act in a foreign country on behalf of a [U.S. 
bankruptcy] estate.” Id. §	1505. This mechanism enables coordination between U.S. and 
foreign insolvency proceedings, but it is not self-executing, nor does it guarantee any 
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proceedings, but it does not bind U.S. courts to cooperation with foreign proceedings. 
 123. Westbrook, supra note 121, at 346–47. 
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noted previously,124 under current bankruptcy law, non-debtor QFC 
counterparties may accelerate, terminate, and liquidate their positions 
without violating the automatic stay that otherwise stops creditor 
collection efforts upon the filing of a bankruptcy.125 This means that if 
at any point post-petition the counterparty is in the money, the 
counterparty can terminate the contract and seize any collateral that 
has been posted for the transaction.126 Thus, as soon as a financial 
institution is in trouble, QFC counterparties can run. The rationale 
for this treatment of QFCs is to limit systemic risk by ensuring that a 
firm’s failure does not lock counterparties into a bankruptcy, thus 
resulting in a domino effect of failures as the counterparties are left 
illiquid and ultimately insolvent.127 
An FIB system need not keep with current law, of course. Every 
version of FIB legislation has proposed a stay of the longer of forty-
eight hours or until 5 p.m. the next business day for QFCs, in keeping 
with the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s forty-
eight-hour Universal Resolution Stay Protocol.128 This term is 
required to be incorporated into the contractual terms of most swaps 
contracts, as well as in the other QFC contracts for globally 
 
 124. See supra Section I.D.  
 125. 11 U.S.C. §	362(b)(6)–(7), (17), (27) (2012); id. §§ 555–556, 559, 561. 
 126. LEVITIN, supra note 7, at 301. 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583 
(noting that “certain protections are necessary to prevent the insolvency of one 
commodity or security firm from spreading to other firms and possibly threatening the 
collapse of the affected market”). The report goes on to note that “[t]he prompt 
liquidation of an insolvent’s position is generally desirable to minimize the potentially 
massive losses and chain reaction of insolvencies that could occur if the market were to 
move sharply in the wrong direction.” Id. at 4, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 585.  
Whether the safe harbors continue to limit systemic risk post-Dodd-Frank Act is 
another matter. In other work, I have observed that the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement 
that most swaps clear through clearinghouses eliminates the financial contagion concern 
for cleared swaps, Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization, supra note 92, at 132, while 
most other QFCs, other than repos, are already cleared through clearinghouses, id. at 154. 
The use of clearinghouses prevents domino effects and renders the safe harbors 
duplicative. Id. at 146.  
 128. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §	122 (creating proposed 11 
U.S.C. §	1187(a)(3)); Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th 
Cong. §	3 (same); Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. §	232 (same); 
Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2016, H.R. 2947, 114th Cong. §	3 (same); 
Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. 5421, 113th Cong. §	3 (2014) (same); 
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., ISDA 2015 UNIVERSAL RESOLUTION STAY 
PROTOCOL 41 (2015), https://online.ercep.com/media/attachments/httpassetsisdaorgmediaa-
en-94349.pdf [http://perma.cc/2DNM-ZGZ8]. OLA has a stay until 5 p.m. on the business 
day following the appointment of the FDIC as a receiver. 12 U.S.C. §	5390(b)(10)(B) 
(2012).  
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systemically important bank holding companies and their depository 
subsidiaries, but it is not in all QFC contracts.129 The goal of the forty-
eight-hour stay is to facilitate a transfer of the failed institutions’ 
derivatives book to a solvent institution through a “weekend” 
bankruptcy that will not disrupt global financial markets.130  
But what if a buyer cannot be found on such short notice? If all 
large financial institutions are distressed, there might not be any 
buyers capable of assimilating a large QFC book. In such a case, a 
temporary stay, no matter what the length, merely would delay the 
start of a run. Unless the stay were to last beyond the time of the sale 
in a GB/BB transaction, it would not be adequate to protect the 
debtor’s QFC book. The longer the stay, however, the less work the 
QFC exceptions would do to prevent systemic risk.131 
The bigger problem with QFCs, however, is that the value of a 
debtor’s individual QFC positions, much less the value of its total 
QFC book or segments thereof, is often not immediately known. This 
is especially true when some of the QFCs are hedges of various loans 
and others are simply free-standing gambles. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A. had, as of March 31, 2018, over $56 trillion in derivative 
exposures in what are surely thousands of contracts.132 Citibank, N.A. 
had over $55 trillion in derivative exposures at the same time.133 
It would take substantial time to responsibly sort through those 
positions, particularly at a time when the firm is in disarray and key 
personnel in the debtor’s organization may be looking for or have 
already taken other employment opportunities. This means that there 
would be substantial valuation uncertainty about the QFC book of 
the financial institution, even if its problems do not stem from that 
 
 129. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 130. H.R. REP. NO. 114-477, at 14–15 (2016). 
 131. The solution utilized in some FIB bills, as well as in OLA, is to have a “bridge 
institution” assume the qualified financial contracts, including derivatives. A bridge 
institution, however, is not a permanent solution. It is a holding pen for assets until the 
assets or the equity of the bridge institution can be sold to a purchaser. All the creation of 
the bridge institution does is impose an intermediate step in moving the failed firm’s 
valuable assets to new ownership. Yet just as with DIP, a bridge institution itself requires 
financing to maintain its liquidity, and to the extent that a buyer or other source of 
financing cannot be found before the stay on the qualified financial contracts expires, 
there will be a run on the bridge institution.  
 132. Statistics on Depository Institutions, FDIC, https://www5.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp?
formname=compare [http://perma.cc/4NXA-KT9H (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 133. Id. 
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book of business.134 Because of that valuation uncertainty, a potential 
buyer in a GB/BB structure would either not purchase the QFC book 
or would insist on a steep discount because of the valuation 
uncertainty. Either situation would likely magnify the losses in 
bankruptcy and thus would increase the likelihood of a domino effect 
as impaired creditors themselves fail.  
D. FIB Lacks a Mechanism for Addressing Valuation Uncertainty 
like the Orderly Liquidation Fund 
The valuation uncertainty problem is particularly acute for 
QFCs, but it is hardly limited to them. The failed financial institution 
might have a large book of residential or commercial mortgages of 
uncertain value, and the need for speed created by the automatic stay 
exceptions for QFCs also creates a valuation uncertainty problem for 
non-QFC assets. 
In FDIC receiverships, including under OLA, the valuation 
uncertainty problem for QFCs and other types of assets can be 
addressed through an FDIC shared loss agreement. A common form 
of FDIC bank resolution is through a Purchase and Assumption 
agreement in which a solvent bank agrees to take over certain assets 
of a failed bank. Sometimes the FDIC guarantees the performance of 
some of the purchased assets under such agreements.135 The result is 
that the purchased assets are on the books of the purchaser, but the 
valuation risk, at least to the extent that it is due to the credit 
performance on the purchased assets, lies at least in part with the 
FDIC. Nothing, however, prevents the FDIC from expanding loss 
sharing agreements to cover risks beyond credit performance.  
The FDIC uses such shared loss agreements in part because of 
the need for speed in the FDIC resolution process. The FDIC likes, 
when possible, to maintain the operations of a failed bank without 
interruption. That means finding a buyer between the time when the 
FDIC takes over a bank (often at the close of business on Friday) and 
when the bank is next scheduled to open for business. Such a speedy 
 
 134. The all-or-nothing assumption requirements that require the transfer as a block of 
all or no QFCs with any given counterparty only add to the valuation uncertainty problem. 
While these provisions are designed to prevent cherry-picking and create pressure for the 
transfer of all QFCs, they also mean that the transferee has no idea what it is taking. 
Notably, such an all-or-nothing assumption is also required in OLA. 12 U.S.C. 
§	5390(c)(9)(A) (2012). 
 135. See, e.g., FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 18 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/about/
freedom/drr_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZP-6SL7]. 
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turnaround precludes meaningful diligence of the assets—and hence a 
precise valuation—by the purchaser. The use of shared loss 
agreements enables the transaction to close quickly by shifting 
valuation risk onto the FDIC.  
The limited stay for QFCs generates a similar need for speed in 
FIB proposals. There is no provision for FDIC shared loss 
agreements in FIB proposals, however, because this sort of use of 
government funds (even if they are only of a mutual insurance fund 
administered by the government) is anathema to the whole “private” 
FIB concept. In contrast, OLA expressly provides for an Orderly 
Liquidation Fund that could be used to address the valuation 
uncertainty in quick-turnaround GB/BB transactions that preclude 
careful buyer diligence of assets.136 
Thus, not only does FIB lack a credible mechanism for financing 
a bankruptcy, even a very fast one, but it also lacks a mechanism to 
overcome the valuation uncertainty problem that the GB/BB 
transaction structure is meant to overcome. A GB/BB problem is 
supposed to address valuation uncertainty by separating good assets 
from a debt overhang. But if the assets to be transferred to the Good 
Bank are of uncertain value, it is unlikely that there will be a 
purchaser readily available within forty-eight hours absent a 
regulatory shotgun to the back.   
IV.  SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL RISK AS A POLITICAL QUESTION 
A. The Political Nature of Systemic Risk 
The failure of a large financial institution is not merely a private 
matter between the debtor and its creditors. It is a matter of public 
concern because of the possibility of a systemic financial risk 
externality—that the failure of a financial institution would impose 
costs throughout the financial system, potentially resulting in a 
domino effect of financial institution failures and, ultimately, a 
contraction of economic activity in the real economy because of a lack 
of liquidity from financial markets. As I have argued elsewhere, there 
is no meaningful economic definition of “systemic risk.”137 It is not a 
measurable concept. Instead, the term is only sensible as a label for 
the political importance of a firm’s financial failure in terms of 
political unwillingness to allow the social consequences from the 
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institution’s failure to materialize without intervention. Systemic risk 
is a political question, but the bankruptcy court system is not built to 
handle political questions. 
American courts have a long-standing political question 
doctrine—the courts will not insert themselves into political questions 
properly committed to another branch of government.138 There are 
two related reasons underlying this prudential doctrine. First, if the 
courts insert themselves into political issues, they might simply be 
disregarded, thereby eroding the standing of the courts. Second, the 
political question doctrine protects the legitimacy of the courts for 
when they rule on nonpolitical questions. 
We should see systemic financial problems as political questions. 
The failure of large financial institutions creates a high likelihood of 
spillover effects into the broader economy and a response that 
involves the public fisc. Thus, systemic financial crises are ultimately 
distributional matters writ large and affect the general public, not just 
disputes between private parties. Such policy questions are not 
appropriate for the courts, much less for non–Article III courts. The 
courts are designed for conducting an adversarial process to resolve 
cases and controversies among litigants, not for determining broader 
questions of economic distribution in society that may affect third 
parties. Those parties have no voice in the court whether because of 
lack of legal standing, lack of knowledge of the case, or lack of 
wherewithal to participate in the case. Such broader distributional 
policy questions are therefore best left to the political branches of 
government. 
It is true that courts regularly adjudicate matters involving the 
public fisc—all tax cases for example139—but these are adjudicated 
within a statutory framework that deals with the liability of individual 
entities to the government or vice versa. It is never in the context of 
general distributional questions, such as which groups of creditors 
should be paid and which should not be. That sort of distributional 
decision should be reserved for the legislature, which may delegate 
the ultimate decision to an administrative agency, as with OLA. The 
combination of the use of the public fisc outside normal government 
 
 138. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
210–11 (1962). 
 139. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Comm’r, 126 F.3d 433, 435, 449 (3d Cir. 1997) (adjudicating 
a dispute between appellant and IRS about whether appellant’s tax deficiency assessment 
resulting from disallowance of tax shelter deduction was valid and analyzing the impact of 
the doctrine of estoppel on the public fisc). 
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spending processes with distributional decisions about who should 
benefit directly or indirectly from the use of those public funds is a 
fundamentally different matter than courts are used to addressing. 
B. The New Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy as a Public Policy Forum 
Since 2008, however, bankruptcy has changed. It has ceased to 
simply be a forum for readjusting financial obligations of private firms 
and individuals and has also become a forum for resolving thorny 
political problems. The Chrysler and GM bankruptcies were the first 
and most explicit instances of this. The auto manufacturers’ 
bankruptcies provided an avenue for the federal government to 
intervene to support the industrial economy throughout the Rust 
Belt. Likewise, post-2008 bankruptcy has been used as a way to 
provide a lifeline to the struggling domestic coal industry by enabling 
coal producers to shed their environmental liabilities and continue 
production.140 To be sure, bankruptcy law always played a role in 
addressing public policy questions, such as how to allocate the risk of 
mass toxic torts or how to deal with the volatile finances of the airline 
industry. But post-2008 bankruptcy has been used more explicitly and 
deliberately by the executive branch as a forum for implementing 
policy. 
Also starting in 2008, the use of Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy 
began to change. Prior to 2008, there were only two hundred non-
erroneous Chapter 9 filings, only thirty-four of which were by 
general-purpose municipalities.141 Most were by special-purpose 
hospitals,142 water or sanitary districts,143 or other specialized local 
governments with discrete financial problems. The only general-
purpose government of any size to file prior to 2008 was Orange 
County, California, which governs the unincorporated areas of the 
county; most other general-purpose municipalities had fewer than one 
thousand residents.144 
 
 140. See Joshua Macey, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal, Chapter 11, and the Erosion of 
Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 141. This data is based on the Author’s analysis of PACER. For a discussion 
expressing doubts about bankruptcy’s utility in the municipal context, see generally Omer 
Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. 
ON REG. 351 (2010). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Green Cty. Hosp., 59 B.R. 388, 391 (S.D. Miss. 1986). 
 143. See, e.g., In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 63 (Bankr. 
D. N.H. 1994). 
 144. For example, Moffett, Oklahoma, population 128 in the 2000 census, filed for 
bankruptcy after it lost its revenue from operating an illegal speed trap on the interstate 
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Since 2008, however, Chapter 9 has been used by large, general-
purpose municipalities: Detroit, Michigan; San Bernardino, Stockton, 
and Vallejo, California; and Jefferson County, Alabama, have all 
gone through Chapter	9.145 Navigating these cities’ insolvencies was 
not just a matter of financial decisionmaking but also involved 
political decisions. All bankruptcies involve distributional choices 
between creditor constituencies: Will money go to bondholders, 
vendors, or tort creditors for their prepetition claims? But with 
municipal bankruptcies there are also taxpayers who are not 
creditors, yet whose interests are very much implicated by any sort of 
payment plan: What level of municipal services will be offered going 
forward? What will municipal tax rates be? Will prized municipal 
assets that add substantially to quality of life, such as the artwork in 
the Detroit Institute of Arts, be sold to pay creditors or retained? 
Chapter 9 cases require navigating the politics of failed cities. 
Bankruptcy scholarship has only just started grappling with the 
increased use of bankruptcy to manage political problems. Melissa 
Jacoby and Edward Janger have both recently written about how 
bankruptcy can manage the politics of decisions in Chapter 9.146 In 
earlier work regarding proposals to allow states to file for bankruptcy, 
 
highway. Tony Thornton & Sheila Stogsdill, Moffett Seeks Bankruptcy Protection: Town 
Bears Toll of Designation as a Speed Trap and Debts Incurred by the Late Mayor, 
NEWSOK (Feb. 2, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://newsok.com/article/3007448/moffett-seeks-
bankruptcy-protectionbrspan-classhl2town-bears-toll-of-designation-as-a-speed-trap-and-
debts-incurred-by-the-late-mayorspan? [http://perma.cc/TC64-PTZZ]. Likewise, the city 
of Washington Park, Illinois, population 5345 in the 2000 census, filed for Chapter 9 
unsuccessfully twice, once after a town employee embezzled the town’s funds and again 
after a successful challenge to the town’s topless dancer license fee. Nicholas J.C. Pistor, 
Washington Park Files for Bankruptcy Protection, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 31, 
2009), https://www.stltoday.com/news/washington-park-files-for-bankruptcy-protection/
article_b2a68ed0-91a3-53c7-87bc-d157c6aa181a.html [https://perma.cc/4RF5-VHK5 (staff-
uploaded archive)] (describing Washington Park, Illinois’s, repeated bankruptcy filings 
following successful challenges to topless dancer license fee). While these examples are 
colorful, they are also typical of the size of general-purpose municipalities that have 
historically filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. 
 145. See Voluntary Petition, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
July 18, 2013); Voluntary Petition, In re City of San Bernardino, No. 6:12-bk-28006 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012); Voluntary Petition, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012); Voluntary Petition, In re Jefferson County, Alabama, 
No. 11-05736-TBB9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2011); Voluntary Petition, In re City of 
Vallejo, No. 2008-26813 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 23, 2008). 
 146. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 
33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 70–71 (2016); Melissa B. Jacoby, Presiding Over Municipal 
Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto Rico, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 385–88 (2017); 
Edward J. Janger, Towards a Jurisprudence of Public Law Bankruptcy Judging, 12 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 46–48 (2017). 
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I have suggested that bankruptcy is generally an inherently political 
process because of its distributional nature, but when bankruptcy 
affects more than creditors, its politics become unmanageable.147 
Likewise, in other work with Aurelia Chaudhury and David 
Schleicher, I consider this problem in the context of simultaneous 
financial crises for overlapping municipal governments.148 
All of this work recognizes the fundamental difficulty of 
managing politics in the bankruptcy process. While bankruptcy judges 
have figured out creative ways to do this in Chapter 9, it is far from an 
ideal process because it gives an unelected judge tremendous 
discretion and is ultimately not at all a democratic process. This 
observation does not commend the expansion of bankruptcy to 
political cases like those of too-big-to-fail financial institutions. 
Ironically, some of those who support the idea of FIB, such as 
Professors David A. Skeel, Jr. and Mark J. Roe, were sharp critics of 
the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies.149 The Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies both used a GB/BB format with the firms’ good assets 
and certain politically favored liabilities—such as obligations to the 
firms’ unionized workforces—assumed by the “Good Chrysler” and 
“Good GM,” and the bad assets and disfavored liabilities left behind 
in “Bad Chrysler” and “Bad GM” for liquidation.150 The Chrysler and 
GM bankruptcies were harshly criticized as having violated 
bankruptcy rules of priority and for being sub rosa reorganization 
plans.151 
 
 147. Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1399, 1451–55 (2012) (arguing that bankruptcy problems need to be addressed in 
political rather than financial terms). 
 148. Aurelia Chaudhury, Adam J. Levitin & David Schleicher, Junk Cities: Resolving 
Insolvency Crises in Overlapping Municipalities, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 149. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 727, 729–31 (2010) (criticizing the Chrysler bankruptcy for failing to adhere to 
bankruptcy priorities). While Professor Skeel has strongly endorsed FIB, see, e.g., Skeel, 
supra note 5, at 329, Professor Roe rightly recognizes the problems with FIB but argues it 
should exist as an option alongside a regulatory resolution scheme, see Mark J. Roe, Why 
Regulators Are Needed to Handle Failed Banks, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/business/dealbook/why-regulators-are-needed-to-handle-
failed-banks.html [https://perma.cc/S5MY-5A55 (dark archive)]. 
 150. See Jeffrey McCracken, John D. Stoll & Neil King Jr., U.S. Threatens Bankruptcy 
for GM, Chrysler, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB123845591244871499 [https://perma.cc/6QL5-8UDE (dark archive)] (describing use of 
bankruptcy for implementing GB/BB plan). 
 151. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 149, at 741; see also Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment 
of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 305, 308 (2010); Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy 
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While these criticisms are arguably incorrect,152 they underscore 
a more fundamental point: the bankruptcy system is not designed for 
dealing with systemic financial crises. When the bankruptcy system is 
used to handle systemically important firms, it is very likely to be 
warped by the weight of political concerns and cease to be the 
neutral, fair process that FIB advocates imagine it to be.153 This will 
be all the more true if DIP financing comes from the only realistic 
source, the U.S. government. 
Contemporary bankruptcy practice often follows the “golden 
rule”—he who has the gold makes the rules.154 This means that it is 
often the DIP lender calling the shots on things such as whether there 
will be an asset sale, what assets will be sold, and what the bidding 
procedures will be.155 Sometimes these issues have to be decided at 
the very beginning of a case before creditors have managed to 
organize themselves. 
In such a situation, the only party capable of staring down an 
over-reaching DIP lender is the bankruptcy judge, but bankruptcy 
judges are not well suited for this role. Bankruptcy judges are not 
Article III judges with life tenure. When a non–Article III judge who 
likely has no expertise regarding the particular debtor firm or 
financial markets generally is presented with a situation in which he is 
told that he must immediately approve a transaction or else the global 
economy will collapse, the judge is put in an untenable position. The 
judge is likely to approve the transaction, whether or not it complies 
with the law. The judge might make some noise but will ultimately be 
rolled.156 
 
Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 
1377–79 (2010). 
 152. The absolute priority rule applies only in a cramdown confirmation, and then only 
to nonconsenting classes of unsecured claimants and equity interests. 11 U.S.C. 
§	1129(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2012). By its own terms, it does not apply to asset sales or to 
consensual plans. The objecting creditors in Chrysler were part of a consenting class of 
secured creditors. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 
F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), appellate decision vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Pension Tr. 
v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009). For a convincing argument that there was nothing 
particularly unusual or illegal about the transaction structures used in the GM and 
Chrysler bankruptcies, see generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and 
Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009). 
 153. See, e.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 151, at 1405. 
 154. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 151, at 308, 313–14. This alone should call into question 
the desirability of bankruptcy as a mechanism for dealing with any problem.  
 155. See id. 
 156. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 8, at 290. 
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The rule-of-law virtues of the bankruptcy system will inevitably 
become warped if the system is dragooned to handle systemic risks 
that trump any law. Put differently, it is bad for bankruptcy courts to 
deal with systemic risk, and it is bad for systemic risk to have 
bankruptcy courts managing the resolution process. Political 
questions like resolution of systemic financial distress should be 
resolved in the political forum, not the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
What would happen if we go down the FIB rabbit hole? One of 
three things. First, the bankruptcy process would be abused, as 
alleged to have occurred in the GM and Chrysler bailouts, to achieve 
the financial stability end sought by whatever administration is in 
office. In other words, a bailout would occur through bankruptcy. 
Second, there would be a questionably illegal, ad hoc bailout, with 
lots of finger-wagging, clucking, and tsk-tsking after the fact, as 
occurred with the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund to aid 
Mexico in 1995,157 or the Federal Reserve’s Maiden Lane structures in 
2008,158 or the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund in 2008 to bail 
out money market mutual funds.159 Or third, Congress would rapidly 
pass bailout-authorization legislation, much as it did with the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in 2008.160 
None of these are desirable outcomes. Nobody likes bailouts. 
But realistically they are inevitable when things get bad enough 
because no one wants to deal with the political consequences of a true 
economic meltdown.161 The realistic goal is not avoiding bailouts 
altogether but finding a predictable legal framework for the bailouts 
that distributes as much of the cost as possible to the beneficiaries of 
the bailout at a time when it will not cause systemic disruption. 
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Insisting on bankruptcy as a bailout alternative is ideologically-driven 
self-deception. The pursuit of the Fool’s Gold of FIB will ultimately 
result in bailouts whether in the guise of bankruptcy or otherwise. 
Furthermore, it does no favor to the rule of law to saddle legal 
procedures like bankruptcy with political questions like bailouts. No 
end is served by pretending that bailouts are creatures of law; a wolf 
in sheep’s clothing is still a wolf. Yet that is precisely what the 
pipedream of FIB would do. We need to accept that as distasteful as 
bailouts may be, as long as there are systemically important financial 
institutions the resolution dilemma will always be resolved with a 
bailout.  
We do not want to be comfortable with bailouts, and we should 
not be. The best way to avoid bailouts is through better ex ante 
regulation. If risk is adequately managed on the front end, there will 
be no need to deal with the consequences on the back end. Yet 
markets change and innovate, and there is constant political pressure 
for deregulation. Even without these pressures, no system of 
regulation is foolproof, so bailouts may be unavoidable in some 
circumstances. 
Avoiding the resolution dilemma and its inevitable outcome 
means ensuring a robust prudential regulatory regime that can reduce 
systemic risk and prevent crises in the first place. Regulators’ single 
most potent tool for managing risk is the living wills process, 
including the authority for regulators to break up the biggest banks 
before they break the economy. An FIB process would neutralize the 
living wills power, thereby both preventing regulators from managing 
systemic risk and saddling them with a resolution process that is 
doomed to fail. Most importantly, FIB would require regulators to 
step in with a bailout to contain the resulting crisis—simply put, FIB 
all but guarantees bailouts rather than being an antidote. We should 
plug our ears to the bankruptcy Lorelei’s louche song before it lures 
us onto the financial rocks and call out FIB for the fib it is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
